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ABSTRACT

An individual's status as a resident of a long-term care facility has the
potential to significantly limit his or her ability to vote. While the high
rates of dementia among residents of long-term care facilities may lead
some to conclude that such limitations are for the best, this article
argues that individuals' access to the ballot and to assistance with ballot
completion should not be limited by their institutional status.
Specifically, it argues that long-term care facilities should be neither
required nor permitted to play a "gate-keeping" role in the electoral
process by screening residents for mental capacity to vote before
permitting or facilitating access to the ballot. Nor, it argues, should
electoral officials single out long-term care residentsfor such capacity
testing. Rather, the article concludes that both states and long-term care
facilities should consider themselves to have an affirmative duty to
facilitate long-term care residents' participationin the electoral process.
If policymakers are sufficiently concerned that long-term care residents
are voting when too compromised by dementia to understand the nature
and consequences of doing so, a phenomenon of which there is little
evidence, policymakers should createfair processesfor disenfranchising
voters that apply equally across residentialsettings.
I. INTRODUCTION

While residents of long-term care facilities constitute less than one percent of
the American population,' they are increasingly attracting the attention of those
concerned about the integrity of the election process. This is because such
residents suffer from high rates of dementia, are perceived to be unusually
susceptible to voter fraud, and face some of the most significant barriers to
exercising their right to vote.
This article explores current and potential policies, practices, and issues
related to voting by residents of long-term care (LTC) facilities, including
nursing homes and assisted living facilities. It focuses on two key, interrelated
concerns: (1) providing residents with meaningful access to the ballot, and (2)
1. There are approximately one and a half million nursing home residents in America. See NAT'L CTR.
NURSING HOME SURVEY, 2004 FACILITY TABLES, tbl.1 (2004),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nnhsd/nursinghomefacilities2006.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Estimates of the number of persons residing in assisted living facilities vary widely, but it appears that nearly
one million persons can reasonably be said to reside in assisted living facilities nationwide. See ROBERT
MOLLICA & HEATHER JOHNSON-LAMARCHE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., STATE RESIDENTIAL
CARE & ASSISTED LIVING POLICY: 2004 1-2 (Janet O'Keeffe ed., 2005), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/
04alcoml.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("In 2004, states reported 36,451 licensed residential
care facilities with 937,601 units/beds"). See also Nat'l Ctr. for Assisted Living, Assisted Living Resident
Profile, www.ncal.org/about/resident.cfm (last visited Aug. 12, 2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(concluding that more than 900,000 people live in assisted living residences).
FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, NATIONAL
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minimizing improper and abusive voting practices. After providing an overview
of the nature and composition of LTC facilities, the article describes the barriers
to voting encountered by LTC residents and the extent to which LTC residents
are victimized by fraudulent voting practices. It then analyzes whether nursing
homes and similar institutions should play a "gate-keeping" role in the electoral
process by conditioning access to the ballot or assistance with ballot completion
on a positive assessment of mental capacity.2 After concluding that such gatekeeping is neither legally permissible nor politically desirable, the article
explores alternative approaches to providing LTC residents with meaningful
access to the ballot while guarding against fraudulent voting practices. In so
doing, it explores the implications that the high concentration of persons with
dementia in LTC facilities should have on policies and practices governing
voting in such settings.
II.
A.

OVERVIEW OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZED LONG-TERM CARE POPULATION

Typology of Long-Term Care Institutions

Traditionally, institutional long-term care has been delivered by nursing
homes. The term "nursing home" is generally used to refer to two related types of
institutions: skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) and nursing facilities (NFs). SNFs
are focused on rehabilitative care, and Medicare provides only limited coverage
for SNFs, while NFs are generally focused on chronic care and are not covered
by Medicare.' From a practical point of view, the two types of institutions are
largely indistinguishable to consumers, in large part because the vast majority of
nursing homes are dually certified as both SNFs and NFs.4 In addition, regardless
of whether they are SNFs or NFs, most nursing homes are subject to
comprehensive federal regulations that govern both the quality and type of care
they are to provide.'
Increasingly, however, long-term care services are being provided in
facilities other than nursing homes. In particular, the past decade has seen the
rapid proliferation of assisted living facilities. Such facilities typically provide

2. The phrase "access to the ballot" is sometimes used to refer to the ability of candidates for elected
office to have their names placed on the ballot. In this article, however, the phrase is used to refer to voters'
ability to access a ballot that they can use to register their votes.
3. The statutory definition of a Nursing Facility is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(a) (2000). The statutory
definition of a Skilled Nursing Facility is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(a) (2000). See also 42 C.F.R. § 483.5
(2006) (noting the differentiation in payment for SNFs and NFs).
4. CHARLENE HARRINGTON, HELEN CARRILLO & COURTNEY LACAVA, NURSING FACILITIES, STAFFING,
RESIDENTS AND FACILITY DEFICIENCIES, 1999 THROUGH 2005, at 16 (2006), http://www.nccnhr.org/uploads/

OSCAR2006Partl.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting that 93.9 percent of American
nursing homes were dually certified to participate in both the Medicare program and the Medicaid program in
2005).
5. See 42 C.F.R. § 483 (2006) (regulating all SNFs and NFs that are certified to receive either Medicare
or Medicaid funds).
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room, board, and some degree of medical care or medical monitoring. There is,
however, no federal definition of "assisted living," and today the term is used to
refer to a wide variety of facilities, ranging from those that provide little more
than room and board to those that provide skilled nursing services twenty-four
hours per day.'

B. Demographic Composition of Long-Term Care Institutions
The nursing home population is not representative of the greater American
population. In large part this is because certain segments of the American
population are better able than others to obtain the community-based assistance
they need to avoid institutional placement.
Women are disproportionately likely to experience nursing home placement.7
In part, this reflects the fact that they live longer than men.' However, life
expectancy appears to be only one factor leading to the increased rate of
institutionalization for women. Within each major age group over the age of
sixty-five, woman are disproportionately over-represented in nursing homes as
compared to their male peers. 9 For example, women age seventy-five through
eighty-four are sixty-six percent more likely to reside in a nursing home than are
men of their age, and that percentage rises to eighty percent for women age
eighty-five and over.' ° The connection between race and institutionalization is
somewhat more complex than that between gender and institutionalization.
Whites far outnumber blacks in the nursing home population, and they also
represent a larger portion of the nursing home population than they do of the
overall population." However, this appears to reflect whites' longer life
expectancies." Within any major age group, blacks are more likely to be

6. See ERIC M. CARLSON, CRITICAL ISSUES IN ASSISTED LIVING: WHO'S IN, WHO'S OUT, AND WHO'S
PROVIDING THE CARE 13-16 (2005) (discussing the many definitions of "assisted living"); ERIC M. CARLSON,
LONG-TERM CARE ADVOCACY § 5.07(1) (2004) [hereinafter CARLSON, ADVOCACY] (also discussing the many
definitions of "assisted living").
7.

Jose Ness, Ali Ahmed & Wilbert S. Aronow, Demographic and Payment Characteristicsof Nursing

Home Residents in the United States: A 23-Year Trend, 59 J. GERONTOLOGY SERIES A: BIOLOGICAL SCI. &
MED. SCI. 1213 (2004).
8. See Elizabeth Arias, United States Life Tables, 2003, 54 NAT'L VITAL STATS. REPORTS, No. 14, Apr.
19, 2006, at 4 fig. 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr54/nvsr54-14.pdf (revised Mar. 28, 2007) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (demonstrating and discussing the fact that American women have a longer
life expectancy than American men).
9.

See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., VITAL AND

HEALTH STATS. SERIES 13, No. 152, PUB. No. (PHS) 2002-1723, NATIONAL NURSING HOME SURVEY: 1999
SUMMARY 18 tbl.13 (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_13/srl3_152.pdf
(on file with the

McGeorge Law Review).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Arias, supra note 8, at 3 tbl.A (indicating that white Americans have a longer life expectancy
than black Americans).
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institutionalized in a nursing home than are their white peers.' 3 Finally, persons
with lower income and persons with lower levels of education are more likely to
become nursing home residents
than are those with higher income or those with
4
higher levels of education.
Unfortunately, in large part because the term "assisted living" is used so
imprecisely, it is difficult to obtain accurate and meaningful data on the
demographics and needs of the assisted living population. Moreover, recent
efforts to shift portions of the nursing home population into assisted living
settings means the demographic composition of the assisted living population is
in flux. It is clear, however, that women are disproportionately overrepresented in
assisted living residences. Studies suggest that between seventy-four percent and
seventy-nine percent of assisted living residents are female.15 Assisted living
residents are also disproportionately white.'6 This is particularly true of residents
in assisted living facilities that provide for high levels of service, high levels of
privacy, and a high level of resident control. 7 Relative to nursing home residents,
assisted living residents are both more affluent and more likely to be collegeeducated.' 8 These socio-economic differences likely reflect, at least in part,
differences in how nursing home care and assisted living care are financed.
Nearly two-thirds of nursing home residents' care is paid for by Medicaid.' 9 By
contrast, the vast majority of assisted living care in the United States is paid for
with private funds.20
13. See NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 9. This is a relatively new trend. See Christine
E. Bishop, Where Are the Missing Elders? The Decline in Nursing Home Use, 1985 and 1995, 18 HEALTH AFF.
146, 148 (1999) (discussing the prior racial composition of nursing homes).
14.

See

TIMOTHY

A. WAIDMANN

&

SEEMA THOMAS, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN

ESTIMATES OF THE RISK OF LONG-TERM CARE: ASSISTED LIVING AND NURSING HOME FACILITIES

SERV.,

6-7 (2003),

http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/riskest.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
15. See Elzbieta Sikorska-Simmons, Linking Resident Satisfaction to Staff Perceptions of the Work
Environment in Assisted Living: A Multilevel Analysis, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 590, 593 (2006) (finding in a study
of Maryland assisted living facilities that seventy-four percent of residents were women); Sheryl Zimmerman et
al., Assisted Living and Nursing Homes: Apples and Oranges?, 43 GERONTOLOGIST 107, 114 (2003) (in a
survey of assisted living type facilities in four states, finding that approximately seventy-six percent of residents
were female); CATHERINE HAWES, CHARLES D. PHILLIPS & MIRIAM ROSE, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., HIGH SERVICE OR HIGH PRIVACY ASSISTED LIVING FACILITIES, THEIR RESIDENTS AND STAFF: RESULTS

FROM A NATIONAL STUDY (2000), http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/hshp.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law

Review) (finding that 78.6 percent of the residents of high service and/or high privacy assisted living facilities
are women).
16. See Zimmerman et al., supra. note 15, at 115 tbl.5 (in a survey of assisted living facilities in four
states, finding that over ninety percent of residents were white); Sikorska-Simmons, supra note 15, at 593
(finding, in a study of Maryland assisted living facilities, that ninety-four percent of residents were white);
HAWES, PHILLIPS & ROSE, supranote 15 (finding that 98.7 percent residents in high service and/or high privacy
assisted living facilities were white).
17. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 15, at 114. See also HAWES, PHILLIPS & ROSE, supra note 15
(finding that in high service and/or high privacy assisted living facilities, 98.7 percent of residents were white).
18. See WAIDMANN & THOMAS, supra note 14, at 6-7.
19.
HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & LACAVA, supra note 4, at 18.
20. Catherine Hawes et al., A National Survey of Assisted Living Facilities, 43 GERONTOLOGIST 875,
875 ("The [assisted living] industry is largely private pay and unaffordable for low- or moderate-income
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C. Incidence of Dementia in Long-Term Care Institutions
As has been noted, "[s]urprisingly little is known about the prevalence of
dementia among nursing home residents.",2' Estimates of the prevalence of
dementia in the nursing home population range from approximately a quarter to
more than two-thirds of the population,22 and estimates appear to vary both by the
type of method used to assess prevalence and by whether the estimate is based on
admissions information or information about the entire nursing home
population.23
Perhaps the best indication of the prevalence of dementia in the nursing
home population is the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting system
(OSCAR), to which all federally certified nursing homes are required to report.24
In 2005, facilities and states reported that 45.4 percent of nursing home residents
had a diagnosis of dementia. 25 The percentage of residents with dementia
diagnoses, however, varied widely from state to state and ranged "from 38.2
percent in Arkansas to 56.5 percent in Maine."26
While the OSCAR reports appear to be the most comprehensive source of
information about the prevalence of dementia within the nursing home
population, other estimates also deserve consideration. For example, a study of
new admissions in nursing homes in Maryland used an expert panel to determine
the percentage of such residents exhibiting dementia consistent with the criteria
set forth in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders III-R
(DSM-III-R). 7 The study found that between 48.2 percent to 54.5 percent of new
admissions could be properly classified as demented. 28 The study further found
that among these newly admitted residents the incidence of dementia correlated
with a greater inability to independently perform activities of daily living (ADLs)
such as toileting, bathing, transferring, dressing, eating, and walking. 29 Indeed,

persons aged >75 unless they use assets as well as income to pay.").
21. Jay Magaziner et al., The Prevalence of Dementia in a Statewide Sample of New Nursing Home
Admissions Aged 65 and Older, 40 GERONTOLOGIST 663, 663 (2000).

22.

Id. at 667 (reviewing past studies).

23. Id.
24. Given that nursing homes are generally reimbursed at higher rates for residents with higher care
needs than for residents with lower care needs, it seems likely that, to the extent that OSCAR reports are biased,
they are biased in favor of over-reporting the rates of dementia. Cf Charlene Harrington, Janis O'Meara, Martin
Kitchener, Lisa Payne Simon & John F. Schnelle, Designing a Report Cardfor Nursing Facilities: What
Information Is Needed and Why, 43 GERONTOLOGIST 47, 54-55 (2003) ("[F]acilities have a financial incentive
to report higher acuity levels (case-mix) to maximize their Medicare reimbursement under the Medicare

prospective payment system and in those states that use case-mix reimbursement for Medicaid.").
25.

HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & LACAVA, supra note 4, at 42.

26.

Id.

27.

The DSM-11

has since been

updated by the DSM-IV-TR. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,

DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 2000).

28.

Magazineret al., supra note 21, at 663.

29.

Id.
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the Maryland study determined that nearly three-quarters of those identified as
demented had impairments in four or more areas.30
Information about the prevalence of dementia among assisted living residents
is even more limited than information about the prevalence of dementia among
nursing home residents. A 2003 survey of 1,251 administrators of "eligible"
assisted living facilities reported that 34.1 percent of assisted living residents had
severe to moderate dementia." However, it is hard to put much faith in this
estimate, given that the surveyors selected only a subset of those facilities
identified as assisted living residences and then relied on the survey answers of
facility administrators.32 Moreover, a subsequent study suggests that the actual
rate of dementia may be higher and that administrators may not be sufficiently
aware of residents' mental states.33
There is an even greater dearth of information about what proportion of LTC
residents with dementia lack the capacity to vote.34 This lack of information
reflects the fact that the existence of dementia does not itself indicate a lack of
voting capacity.35 While there appears to be a strong, inverse correlation between
capacity to vote and severity of dementia,36 the determination of whether a person

30. Id. at 669 tbl.4.
31. Hawes et al., supra note 20, at 878.
32. While the authors identified nearly 3,000 potential assisted living facilities with which to conduct
interviews, over half of these facilities were declared "ineligible" because they were a facility that either had
fewer than eleven beds, did not serve a primarily elderly population, or did not "represent itself as an assisted
living facility or offer at least a basic level of services, which included twenty-four hour a day staff oversight,
housekeeping, at least two meals a day, and personal assistance, defined as help with at least two of the
following: medications, bathing, or dressing." Id. at 876. Thus, it seems highly unlikely that the sample was
representative of all those facilities which commonly call themselves assisted living facilities. Moreover, it
seems unlikely that the administrators interviewed were in a position to accurately report the rate of dementia in
their facilities. Nearly two-thirds of the facilities provided only "low" or "minimal" levels of services (i.e., did
not have an RN on staff at least forty hours per week and provide nursing care). Id. at 877-88. Whether such
facilities would have the information needed to assess dementia is questionable and whether they would take the
measures needed to accurately describe the information even if they had it in order to respond to a telephone
survey is even more questionable.
33. Homa Magsi & Timothy Malloy, Underrecognition of Cognitive Impairment in Assisted Living
Facilities, 53 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 295 (2005) (surveying residents in seven unscientifically selected
assisted living facilities in Omaha, Nebraska).
34. One of the only studies to look at this issue, a 1998 survey of activity directors at nursing homes and
assisted living facilities in three Florida counties, found that 38.2 percent of the directors thought that "'some'..
. of their residents suffer[ed] from mental problems that affect[ed] their ability to follow political campaigns"
and that 42.1 percent believed that "a lot" of their residents suffered from such a problem. SUSAN A.
MACMANUS, TARGETING SENIOR VOTERS: CAMPAIGN OUTREACH TO ELDERS AND OTHERS WITH SPECIAL

NEEDS 41 (2000).

35. Cf Jason H. Karlawish, Richard J. Bonnie, Paul S. Appelbaum, Constantine Lyketsos, Bryan James,
David Knopman, Christopher Patusky, Rosalie A. Kane & Pamela S. Karlan, Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and
Social Issues Raised by Voting by Persons With Dementia, 292 JAMA 1345 (2004) [hereinafter Karlawish et
al., Addressing]; Brian R. Ott, William C. Heindel & George D. Papandonatos, A Survey of Cognitively
Impaired Elderly Patients, 60 NEUROLOGY 1546, 1548 (2003) ("[A] diagnosis of A[lzheimers] D[isease] does
not necessarily imply incompetence to vote .... ).
36. Paul S. Appelbaum, Richard J. Bonnie & Jason H. Karlawish, The Capacity to Vote of Persons with
Alzheimer's Disease, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2094, 2097 (2005).
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suffers from dementia is distinct from the determination of whether a person
lacks voting capacity.
The extent to which LTC residents afflicted with dementia vote is also
unknown, although current research suggests that those with more severe levels
of dementia are less likely to vote.37 The fact that there is a high concentration of
persons with dementia in LTC institutions does not necessarily mean that there is
a high rate of voting by persons with dementia in those settings. Rather, there is
reason to suspect that persons with dementia living in community-based settings
are more likely to vote or be voted for than are their institutionalized peers. A
study of community-dwelling persons with dementia found that persons with
dementia were more likely to vote when their caregiver was a spouse than when
their caregiver was an adult child." The study's authors suggested that this
difference might reflect the intimate and long-standing relationship between
spouses, as well as care-giving spouses' relative availability to assist with
voting.39 Since most nursing home residents with dementia are less likely to have
a spousal caregiver than their community-dwelling peers, these findings lead to
the reasonable hypothesis that nursing home residents with dementia may be less
likely to vote (or be voted for) than their community-dwelling peers.
III. VOTING PRACTICES, PATTERNS, AND CONCERNS IN LONG-TERM
CARE FACILITIES

A.

Voting Access

Residents of LTC facilities are often quite interested in voting and many do
vote,4 yet they experience significant barriers to voting. Some of these barriers are
the natural result of residents' physical conditions, conditions that may be the basis
for their placement. For example, the majority of nursing home residents are chairbound, meaning that they are unable to walk without extensive or constant support
from another person or persons.4' Mental impairments may also create barriers to
voting, even if those impairments do not undermine the resident's ability to make

37. See Ott, Heindel & Papandonatos, supra note 35 (in a survey of one hundred outpatients with
dementia, finding that increased severity of dementia was associated with reduced voting participation); Jason
H. Karlawish et al., Do Persons with Dementia Vote?, 58 NEUROLOGY 1100, 1102 (2002) [hereinafter
Karlawish et al., Do Persons with Dementia Vote] (reporting that persons with more severe dementia are less
likely to vote than persons with mild or moderate levels of dementia).
38. Karlawish et al., Do Persons with Dementia Vote, supra note 37, at 1101-02. See also Harald De
Cauwer, Are Cognitively Impaired Older Adults Able to Vote, GERIATRICS, Mar. 1, 2005, at 13 (reporting the
results of a Belgian study which found that demented persons residing in the community were more likely to
vote if they resided with a spouse than if they lived alone or with a family member other than a spouse).
39. Karlawish et al., Do Persons with Dementia Vote, supra note 37, at 1102.
40. This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. See Paul Brettle, Do Nursing Home Residents
Use the Right to Vote?, 91 NURSING TIMES, No. 5 1, Dec. 1995, at 40 (finding, in a study nursing home residents
in England, that residents voted at a rate slightly under half of that of the general electorate).
41. HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & LACAVA, supra note 4, at 36-37 tbl. 14.
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informed voting choices. Residents may, for instance, have impaired short-term
memory that makes it difficult to remember instructions for requesting a ballot or
confusion that makes the process of requesting a ballot excessively difficult.
The barriers to voting faced by LTC residents, however, extend beyond those
internal to the residents. For at least some LTC residents, especially those residing in
nursing homes, the institutional settings in which they reside create additional
barriers.
First and foremost, staff attitudes and beliefs about residents and about
whether residents should vote play a critical role in limiting access to the
franchise. Such attitudes and beliefs may translate into the active disenfranchisement of residents. For example, it appears that many nursing homes engage
in some form of screening for voting
• 42 capacity before permitting residents to vote
or assisting residents with voting. To screen residents, staff use a variety of
techniques, ranging from asking election-related questions (such as quizzing
residents on current political officer holders), to conducting a Folstein MiniMental State Exam (MMSE), to assessing the residents' abilities to vote based on
earlier assessments of their mental statuses, to simply only asking those they
think have capacity if they want to vote.43 Such assessments, whether formal or
informal, do not appear to reflect any understanding of the level of capacity at
which one could be legally disenfranchised." •45
Indeed, some approaches may have
no relation whatsoever to the legal capacity to vote.
Second, residents of LTC facilities may have reduced access to mechanisms
for communicating with persons outside their facilities compared to those living
in community-based settings. For example, federal law requires that nursing
home residents have access to a telephone and grants residents the right to
confidential telephone communications,46 but there is no requirement that
telephones be provided in individual resident rooms.47 Residents desiring a

42. See Jason H. Karlawish, Richard J. Bonnie, Paul S. Appelbaum, Constantine Lyketsos, Pamela
Karlan, Bryan D. James, Charles Sabatino, Thomas Lawrence, David Knopman & Rosalie Kane, Identifying the
Barriersand Challenges to Voting by Residents in Nursing Homes and Assisted Living Settings, 20 J. AGING &
SOC. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers] (surveying LTC facilities
in the Philadelphia area); see also Richard Bonnie et al., How Does Voting Occur in Long-Term Care, Interview
Script and Responses (Spring 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
43. See Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers, supra note 42 (surveying LTC facilities in the
Philadelphia area regarding methods of screening residents to vote); see also Bonnie et al., supra note 42
(finding that eighteen percent of the LTC care facilities surveyed during a pilot study identified residents who
wanted to vote in the preceding election by asking only those residents whom staff thought could vote). The
Folstein Mini Mental State Exam is a simple, widely-used instrument for assessing cognitive impairment.
44. Cf Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers, supra note 42 (finding that, in a survey of LTC
facilities in the Philadelphia area, "[n]o staff member used a standardized method of assessing voting
competence grounded in constitutional law").
45. For example, in a pilot survey of LTC facilities in Virginia, one facility responded that persons who
"had" a power of attorney would not be allowed to vote. See Bonnie et al., supra note 42, at 15.
46. See 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(e)(1) (2006) ("The resident has the right to personal privacy .... Personal
privacy includes ... written and telephone communications .... ).
47. See id. § 483.10(c)(8)(ii)(A) (explicitly stating that facilities may impose additional charges for
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personal phone, if one is possible, must generally pay for it from their personal
funds. For the nearly two-thirds of nursing home residents on Medicaid,48
personal funds are limited to a monthly personal needs allowance which, under
federal law, can be as little as thirty dollars per month.4 '9 Thus, for many residents,
obtaining a private telephone call requires a specific request to staff for
permission and access. Similarly, many nursing home residents must rely on staff
to both mail and deliver postal items. Nursing home residents also tend to lack
access to more modern means of communication, such as the Internet. Finally,
both residents' physical conditions and nursing homes' internal rules generally
limit residents' freedom to leave the facility. This means that residents are
limited in their ability to associate with persons who are not affiliated with the
facility. The result of these limitations on communication is that nursing home
residents often cannot request an absentee ballot-or even discuss political
opinions with persons outside the facility-without going through an institutional
intermediary.
Third, institutional placement can limit access to outside information. Media
is an important source of information for voters: it not only serves to educate
them about candidates or propositions, but also to remind them of the time and
place of elections. Compared to their community-dwelling peers, LTC residents
are less likely to have control over whether they have access to media and are
less likely to be able to select what media sources they can access. For example,
for many nursing home residents, the only available television may be in a
common area, and they may not be able to control what is shown on it. The
problems created by a lack of access to media are compounded by a lack of direct
information from candidates. Candidates for political office devote little attention
to winning the support of nursing home residents." By comparison, candidates
spend disproportionately large amounts of time courting non-institutionalized
seniors. 5'
Fourth, institutional placement corresponds to social changes that reduce
nursing home residents' access to outside assistance and information. Placement
in a nursing home is associated with a marked decline in contact with family and
friends. 2 One study found that within the first few months of placement,

telephone access even to persons whose payment is otherwise covered by Medicare or Medicaid). Notably, the
problem posed by the lack of private telephone access has long been recognized. See JEANIE SCHMIT KAYSERJONES, OLD, ALONE, AND NEGLECTED 114 (1981).
48. HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & LACAVA, supra note 4, at 18.
49. See 42 C.F.R. § 436.832(c)(1)(i) (2006).
50. MACMANUS, supra note 34, at 36-37, 68 (urging candidates to change their current outreach
practices so as not to "ignore" the nursing home and assisted living populations); Joan L. O'Sullivan, Voting
and Nursing Home Residents, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 325, 342 (2001) (finding, in a study of voting
among nursing home residents in Maryland, that politicians rarely visited nursing homes).
51. MACMANUS,supra note 34, at 34-37.
52. Cynthia L. Port et al., Resident Contact With Family and Friends Following Nursing Home
Admission, 41 GERONTOLOGIST 589 (2001) (examining both telephone and in-person contacts).
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residents' contact with their families dropped by approximately fifty percent. 3
This decline appears to be especially large for blacks.54 There is also reason to
believe that contact is disproportionately reduced for poorer residents.55
Some of these barriers to voting can be overcome by bringing the polling
place to LTC residents. For example, in some communities, mobile vans staffed
by either election officials or volunteers conduct on-site voting at nursing
homes. 56 Temporary voting booths may also be set up on site. 57 However, when
nursing home residents vote, they typically utilize an absentee ballot, 58 which
places them at increased risk of being the targets of voter fraud.5 9
In part because of concerns about possible fraud in the absentee balloting
process, twenty-three states have absentee balloting procedures that specifically
address absentee balloting by nursing home residents. 0 There is significant
agreement in the approaches that states take toward providing ballots to nursing
home residents. The typical provision provides for election officials to deliver
and supervise absentee ballots where a threshold number of ballots are requested
from a given facility.6' By contrast, states vary significantly in their provisions for
nursing home residents needing assistance with ballot completion. 6 A number of
states provide for residents to be assisted by election officials but are silent as to
whether other persons may also provide assistance 63 Some states require election

53. Id. at 595.
54. Id. at 593-94.
55. Individuals receiving Medicaid have less contact with family and friends than do residents whose
nursing home stay is being paid for privately. See id. at 592-93.
56.

MACMANUS, supra note 34, at 91.

57. Id. at 91-92.
58. Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers,supra note 42; Bonnie et al., supra note 42. This appears to
be true in Britain as well as in the United States. See Brettle, supra note 40, at 40.
59. Indeed, the absentee ballot process-especially when it relies on mail-in ballots-is perhaps the single
biggest source of voter fraud. See GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTIONS: THE NATION'S EVOLVING
ELECTION SYSTEM AS REFLECTED IN THE NOVEMBER 2004 GENERAL ELECTION, GAO-06-450, at 18 (June
2006), www.gao.gov/new.items/d06450.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting a variety of
problems that occur with absentee ballots and reporting that election officials consider mail-in absentee ballots
to be especially susceptible to fraud); COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS 35 (2005), http://www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing mail-in absentee balloting as one of the major sources of election fraud); NAT'L COMM'N
ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, To ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 44 (2004),

http://www.tcf.org/Publications/ElectionReform/99_full-report.pdf (describing mail-in absentee balloting as
creating "the most likely opportunity for election fraud now encountered by law enforcement officials") (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Accord Daniel P. Tokaji & Ruth Colker, Absentee Voting By People with
Disabilities:PromotingAccess and Integrity, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1015, 1025 (2007).

60. See Amy Smith & Charles P. Sabatino, Voting by Residents of Nursing Homes and Assisted Living
Facilities: State Law Accommodations, 26 BIFOCAL 1, 6-7 tbl.1 (2004). A review of the statutory landscape
indicated that the Smith and Sabatino study remained largely current as of November 2006.
6 1. See id. at 4.
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-159q(g) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (stating that "[ilf any
elector asks for assistance in voting his ballot, [the relevant election officials] shall render such assistance as
they deem necessary and appropriate to enable such elector to vote his ballot."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
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officials to help residents who request assistance but explicitly allow residents to
receive assistance from other persons just as non-institutionalized persons
might. 64 One state allows for assistance by both election officials and third parties
but places limitations on third-party assistance that apply specifically to the LTC
population.65 Yet other states have LTC-specific voting provisions but
nevertheless lack LTC-specific provisions regarding assistance with ballot
completion.6

In addition to varying from state to state, assistance practices and standards
tend to vary widely from facility to facility.67 In part, this appears to reflect
different attitudes about voting held by staff in different facilities.68 It also
appears to reflect differences in staff's knowledge of election procedures. For
example, a study of nursing home practices in Florida determined that one reason
why some facilities requested assistance for residents from election officials
while others did not was that many of those that did not were unaware that they
could request such assistance. 69
B.

Voting Fraud

While the potential exists for fraud in nursing home voting, evidence of its
occurrence is minimal and largely anecdotal. To date, there has been no systemic
study of voting fraud in LTC settings, and there is no meaningful available
3509.08 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2007) (providing for residents to receive assistance from election officials
but silent as to whether other persons may also provide assistance); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-20-14(a) (2003 &
Supp. 2006) (requiring election officials to "provide assistance, if requested" but silent as to whether other
persons may also provide assistance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-19-9.1 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (providing for the
auditor's representative and accompanying representatives of political parties to assist residents with ballot
completion, but silent as to whether other persons may also so assist). Notably, of these, only Connecticut's
statute seems to easily lend itself to the interpretation that assistance from other parties is prohibited.
64. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 203B.11, 204C.15 (West 1992 & Supp. 2007) (providing for
election officials to assist with ballot completion and allowing for any other person to assist as well, provided
that they are not "the voter's employer, an agent of the voter's employer, an officer or agent of the voter's
union, or a candidate for election"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-6-105, 2-6-601(a), 2-7-116(a)(1) (2003) (providing
for voting deputies to assist residents, but explicitly stating that residents voting early are entitled to receive the
same assistance as residents voting at the polls and that residents voting at the polls are entitled to receive
assistance from anyone they choose).
65. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1333(g) (2004 & Supp. 2007) (providing for an election official to
assist residents with ballot completion but allowing residents to "receive assistance from any person of [their]
selection, except a candidate in the election and except the owner, operator, or administrator of the nursing
home or an employee of any of them. However, no person except a spouse, blood relative, or the registrar may
assist more than one voter in voting.").
66. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-112 (West 2004) (silent on assistance); IND. CODE ANN. § 311-10-25 (West 2006 & Supp. 2006) (silent on assistance); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 91B (West Supp.
2007) (silent on assistance); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14-115 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (silent on
assistance).
67. See Karlawish et al., Identifying the Barriers,supra note 42, at 12-14.
68. See id. at 14 (concluding that "differences in voter participation are mainly associated with attitudes
and practices of staff rather than with facility characteristics or formal policies.").
69. MACMANUS, supra note 34, at 108.
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estimate as to its frequency, type, or severity. This is not surprising, as there is
little statistical evidence of the frequency of voting fraud in general.
Several high-profile court cases have been brought alleging that nursing
home residents' ballots were improperly completed. In the 1980s, two cases
uncovered bold schemes to commit fraud in LTC facilities. In United States v.
Odom, the Fourth Circuit upheld the convictions of three defendants on charges
of mail fraud arising out of a fraudulent absentee balloting scheme. 70 The
defendants, associates of candidates running for office, colluded with the
manager of a North Carolina nursing home to obtain and complete absentee
ballots in the names of the home's residents.7' In United States. v. Olinger, the
Seventh Circuit upheld the criminal conviction of an election judge involved in a
scheme to disenfranchise the residents of Monroe Pavillion, a residential facility
for the elderly and mentally handicapped. Specifically, the defendant in Olinger
instructed fellow election judges that "the residents of Monroe Pavillion were
'crazy'' and that they should ignore residents' voting preferences and instead
punch each resident's ballot to record a vote for each of the Democratic
candidates on the ballot.73 As part of the scheme, another election official paid
residents for these fraudulently obtained votes.74
More recently, in 1998, an unincorporated group named Citizens for
Democratic Elections unsuccessfully brought suit against the Maryland Boards of
Supervisors of Elections alleging that the State's mechanisms for providing
ballots to nursing home residents violated the Voting Rights Act because the
procedures did not provide adequate protections to ensure that ballots were
delivered to and completed by residents. 75 Although the group never proved that
any resident's ballot had ever been improperly marked,76 Citizens for Democratic
Elections submitted several affidavits as part of their filing. One alleged that its
signer, an investigator hired by a candidate for state-wide office, was aware that
"senior citizens who resided in nursing homes, assisted living facilities, senior
citizen housing projects, and similar facilities, and who wished to vote by
absentee ballots were being abused by unscrupulous facility managers." The
signer specifically alleged that "[t]hese managers would intercept the absentee
ballots when they were mailed to the resident at the facility, and would vote them
without the knowledge of the resident, alter the ballots after the votes had been

70. United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 106-07.
72. See United States v. Olinger, 759 F.2d 1293 (7th Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 1297.
74. Id.
75. In addition to other forms of relief, Plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order stopping the
delivery of absentee ballots to nursing home residents until better procedures were implemented. See Brief of
Plaintiffs, Citizens for Democratic Elections v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 98-CV-3416 (D. Md. 1998) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
76. See O'Sullivan, supra note 50, at 327 (describing the case and noting that the plaintiffs never proved
that any resident's ballot had been improperly marked).
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made but before they were returned, or induce the resident to vote for particular
candidates."" The allegation that managers were inducing residents to vote for a
particular candidate appeared to stem from an incident in which nursing home
staff threatened residents with eviction if they did not vote for a particular
candidate.7 ' Another former nursing home staff member swore in an affidavit that
he believed that fraud was occurring at the nursing home where he had worked.
He based his conclusion on his belief that "[n]one of the . . . residents in [his]

care could identify their own voter registration cards when [he] showed them
their documents" and he "later discovered that all ... residents were registered to
79
vote with the same party affiliation and that they had voted in recent elections.
0
•
While Odom, Olinger, the allegations in Citizens, and other instances of
fraudulent voting in LTC facilities are certainly troubling, they appear to
represent relatively isolated events as opposed to systemic or multi-facility
schemes. Furthermore, many, if not most, reports of voter fraud in nursing homes
can not be substantiated, and there is reason to believe that at least some such
reports may stem from events where no legally improper behavior has occurred.
Many reports of fraudulent voting practices are made by parties with an interest
in changing the outcome of a race, 8' and who thus may have an undue incentive
to challenge votes by voters perceived to be feeble or otherwise susceptible to a
successful challenge.82
Moreover, while commentators have focused on concerns about fraudulent
behavior with regard to residents with dementia, it does not appear that the fraud
that has occurred has in fact targeted demented residents. Rather, the limited

77. Affidavit of Drake A. Ferguson at 6, Citizens for Democratic Elections v. Bd. of Supervisors, No.
98-CV-3416 (D. Md. 1998) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
78. Id. In support of concerns about inducement, the signer explained that, "[i]n December, 1994, we
received a complaint regarding Stella Maris Nursing Home, where it was alleged that residents were being
coerced to vote for particular candidates by facility staff members. These residents were told that they would be
'thrown out' if they did note [sic] vote for certain candidates. Volunteer investigators were sent to the facility,
but were denied access by staff members." Id. at 10.
79. Affidavit of Mark Tiger U 3-4, Citizens for Democratic Elections v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 98CV-3416 (D. Md. 1998) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
80. See, e.g., Glover v. S. Carolina Democratic Party, No. C/A 4-04-CV-2171-25, 2004 WL 3262756
(D.S.C. 2004), aff d by Reaves v. S. Carolina Democratic Party, 122 Fed. App'x 83 (4th Cir. 2005) (allowing an
unsuccessful candidate for the South Carolina state senate to successfully challenge the results of a Democratic
primary race by alleging voting irregularities including voting fraud with regard to the absentee ballots of
nursing home residents); State v. Jackson, 811 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 2004) (considering an evidentiary issue in a
criminal case of an Ohio election board employee who allegedly marked nursing home residents' ballots
contrary to residents' wishes).
81. For example, a Detroit City Council candidate initiated a lawsuit against the Detroit City Council
clerk alleging that election officials assisted legally incapacitated persons to vote at a Detroit nursing home. See
David Josar & Lisa M. Collins, State Targets Detroit Ballots, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al. Similarly,
an unsuccessful candidate for the South Carolina state senate, Tim Norwood, successfully challenged the results
of a Democratic primary race by alleging voting irregularities including voting fraud with regard to the absentee
ballots of nursing home residents. See Glover, 2004 WL 3262756 at * 1.
82. Cf Kolb v. Casella, 270 A.D.2d 964, 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding a lower court's decision
to count the disputed ballots of three nursing home residents).
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reports that exist suggest that when fraud occurs, it targets nursing home
residents in general and not simply those residents suffering from diminished
mental capacity.
IV. CAPACITY ASSESSMENT IN LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES

Standardized capacity testing of LTC residents has been proposed as a
technique that would address concerns that LTC staff engage in over-zealous or
uninformed disenfranchisement of residents, as well as concerns that residents
lacking capacity to vote may do so.
In a 2004 article published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA), Jason Karlawish, Richard Bonnie, Pamela Karlan, and
others suggested that a high-stakes assessment system be considered for LTC
residents. The JAMA article noted that staff in LTC facilities tend to "serve as
gatekeepers, deciding whether to inform individuals of their right to vote and
whether and how to assist them in registering or voting. '"" The article called such
screening by LTC staff "inevitabl[e]," cursorily dismissing the idea that "only
voting officials can make judgments regarding incompetence to vote. '' 4 The
article then advocated the development of LTC-specific guidelines and policies
to facilitate this type of screening. Specifically, the authors called for uniform
policies in LTC facilities and recommended the use of a simple capacityassessing instrument." Notably, while the article discussed concerns about voting
by persons with dementia in general, s it only called for uniform policies in LTC
settings.
Since the publication of the JAMA article, Karlawish and his colleagues have
come to present a more circumscribed view on capacity testing. For example,
writing again in 2006, they advised against the "systematic screening of
competence to vote based exclusively on a diagnosis of dementia or on residence
in a long-term care facility."87 They recommended, however, "encouraging

83. Karlawish et al., Addressing, supranote 35, at 1346.
84. Id. at 1348.
85. Id. at 1349.
86. Id. at 1347 ("Nondiscriminatory procedures for applying a test of voter capacity at the voter
registration facility and at the time of voting are needed. For example, if a question is raised about a particular
person's capacity to vote at the polling place, a poll worker might ask the questions described above. Persons
who are unable to answer such questions correctly might then undergo a more detailed assessment.").
87. Jason Karlawish, Paul S. Appelbaum, Richard Bonnie, Pamela Karlan & Stephen McConnell, Policy
Statement on Voting by Persons with Dementia Residing in Long-Term Care Facilities,2 ALZHEIMER'S &
DEMENTIA 243, 244 (2006) [hereinafter Karlawish et al., Policy Statement]. See also Sally Balch Hurme & Paul
S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of
Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 973 (2007) (arguing that not permitting staff to screen residents for voting
capacity would be "wasteful and costly" and would undermine staff's faith in the electoral process, and
recommending informal capacity assessment of residents to identify residents who should have their voting
capacity more formally determined).
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assessments for residents whose voting competence is reasonably in doubt."8
Karlawish, Bonnie, and Paul S. Appelbaum have also since collaborated to
develop an instrument, known as the "CAT-V" and discussed in Part IV(A) of
this article, designed to determine whether or not a person has the capacity to
vote. The team's initial conclusion is that "it appears that the CAT-V may have
some utility for screening voting capacity in the long-term care setting as an
element of a comprehensive set of guidelines designed to promote voter
education and facilitate voting by residents."'8 9
The notion of imposing some form of capacity-testing primarily or
exclusively on LTC residents before permitting them to vote has received some
support from others, with at least one commentator going so far as to suggest that
all nursing home residents should have their capacity tested before being allowed
to vote. 90 A thorough analysis of the constitutional and policy implications of
preventing or restricting access to the ballot based on capacity testing (referred to
at points hereafter as "high-stakes capacity testing") suggests, however, that such
an approach is neither legally permissible nor consistent with good public policy.
A. Due Process Concerns
Permitting or requiring LTC facilities to serve as gatekeepers raises serious
due process concerns. Constitutional due process rights can be expected to attach
if LTC facilities make what are effectively adjudicatory decisions as to residents'
capacities for voting. In general, constitutional due process rights attach when the
government acts to deprive an individual of a liberty interest. Denying citizens
the right to vote is the denial of a liberty interest. 9' Thus, persons faced with such
denials by government actors are entitled to due process protection. 92

88. Karlawish et al., Policy Statement, supra note 87, at 244.
89. Univ. Penn. Healthcare System, Development of the Competency Assessment Tool-Voting (CATV), www.uphs.upenn.edu/adc/old-site/news/votingdevelopment.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2007) (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
90.

See Jessica A. Fay, Elderly Electors Go Postal: EnsuringAbsentee Ballot Integrityfor Older Voters,

13 ELDER L.J. 453, 483 (2005) ("States should implement a capacity test to ensure nursing home residents are
capable of voting."). Cf Fredrick T. Sherman, Get Out the Demented Vote, 59 GERIATRICS 11 (Oct. 2004)

(calling for physicians to take affirmative steps to determine whether their patients lack capacity to vote, and
calling for "special precautions" to be taken with regard to LTC residents and for the development of voting
capacity standards for LTC residents).
91. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curium) ("When the state legislature vests the right
to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental."); Harper v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966) (treating the right to vote as a fundamental right);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (endorsing the idea that the right to vote is a "fundamental political
right").
92. See Bell v. Marinko, 235 F. Supp. 2d 772, 777 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (stating that "[a]n elector cannot be
disenfranchised without notice and an opportunity to be heard" without violating elector's due process rights);
Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-48 (D. Me. 2001) (stating that "the fundamental nature of the right to vote
gives rise to a liberty interest entitled to due process protection" in finding that a state law that barred persons
under guardianship from voting violated constitutional due process protections); Raetzel v. Parks/Bellemont
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When a LTC facility engages in high-stakes screening of residents, it should
be considered to be a "state actor" and thus subject to constitutional due process
requirements. Where the facility involved in screening is government-owned, as
six percent of nursing homes are,93 the screening process would undeniably
constitute state action because the facility's government-owned status makes it a
state actor whenever it acts. 94 Even facilities that are not government-owned,
however, should be found to be subject to due process limitations when they
engage in such high-stakes screening. It is well established that a private actor
may be deemed a state actor for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment if the
private actor carries on a function traditionally reserved to the government. As
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.
149 (1978), while few functions performed by the government can be said to be
traditionally reserved to the government, "our cases make it clear that the
conduct of the elections themselves is an exclusively public function." 95 Since
qualifying and disqualifying voters is at the heart of the conduct of elections,
LTC facilities acting to qualify or disqualify voters would be engaging in a state
function; therefore, due process rights would attach.96

Absentee Elections Bd., 762 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Ariz. 1990) (stating that "[w]hile the state is able to
regulate absentee voting, it cannot disqualify ballots, and thus disenfranchise voters, without affording the
individual appropriate due process protection," and therefore holding unconstitutional a statutory scheme that
did not provide for notice and hearing to voters whose absentee ballots were disqualified); United States v.
Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd 384 U.S. 155 (1966) ("[Tlhe right to vote is one of the
fundamental personal rights included within the concept of liberty as protected by the due process clause.").
93. HARRINGTON, CARRILLO & LACAVA, supra note 4, at 20-21 (reporting that six percent of nursing
homes are government-owned, but showing that the rate of government ownership varies widely from state to
state).
94. See Tinder v. Lewis County Nursing Home Dist., 207 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954-55 (E.D. Mo. 2001)
(finding, in a case in which the estate of a deceased nursing home patient sued for violation of decedent's
substantive due process and negligence, that a county-owned home was a state actor); Rhude v. Belknap
County, No. Civ. 99-397-JD, 2000 WL 1745119 (D.N.H. Oct. 31, 2000) (treating a county-owned nursing home
as a state actor in the context of a suit brought under § 1983 alleging a violation of procedural due process);
Tremblay v. Delaware County, No. Civ. A. 04-2740, 2005 WL 1126960 (E.D. Pa. May 11,2005)
(acknowledging that a county-owned nursing home was a state actor and thus was acting under the color of state
law, thereby triggering due process rights, when it terminated the employment of a doctor); Connor v. Halifax
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 135 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1222 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (in a wrongful death action, finding that a
publicly-owned nursing home was a state actor and thus subject to a § 1983 claim alleging a deprivation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights).
95. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158 (1978).
96. Cf Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (finding that a private organization violated the Fifteenth
Amendment by holding its own primary election, the winner of which effectively became the only candidate in
the Democratic primary); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that the Texas Democratic Party
had violated the Fifteenth Amendment by holding an all-white primary election).
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Having determined that due process rights should attach to facility-level
voter screening, the question is what process is due to LTC residents in such
situations. In general, the touchstone of due process is the provision of notice and
the opportunity Sfor 97a fair hearing prior to the deprivation of a constitutionally
recognized interest. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[w]e tolerate some
exceptions to the general rule requiring pre-deprivation notice and hearing, but
only in 'extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at
stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event."' 9 For the
purpose of determining the contours of the notice and hearing requirement, and
when less process might be permissible, the leading precedent is Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under Mathews, the process due depends on:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.99
A determination of whether high-stakes facility-level screening of LTC residents
would satisfy due process protections thus requires an analysis of the underlying
interests in light of the Mathews factors.'0°
The first factor in the Mathews test weighs heavily in favor of a very robust
form of process. The right to vote is a fundamental right.' O' Indeed, as the

97. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) ("An essential principle of due
process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property 'be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.' . . . We have described 'the root requirement' of the Due Process Clause
as being 'that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest."') (citations omitted). See also 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 905 (2007) ("The
fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon such notice and in such proceedings
as are adequate to safeguard the right for which the constitutional protection is invoked. Exceptions to the
principle that a person must be afforded notice and an opportunity for a hearing before he or she is deprived of
his or her rights can be justified only in extraordinary circumstances. Thus, for purposes of due process, except
in extraordinary situations in which some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing a
hearing until after the event, the government must provide a hearing before depriving an individual of a
protected interest.") (citations omitted).
98. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 334-35.
100. While the Mathews factors were originally simply a framework for addressing due process claims,
they quickly came to be treated as a "test" to be applied to all due process challenges. See Gary Lawson,
Katharine Ferguson & Guillermo A. Montero, Oh Lord,Please Don't Let Me Be Misunderstood: Rediscovering
the Mathews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 21-23 (2005) (explaining
how, "[b]y 1981, the transformation of the Mathews formulation from a framework for discussion into a
decisionmaking [sic] algorithm was complete.").
101. Seesupra note 91.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, it is a foundational right upon which
all other rights are premised.' 2
The second factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedure used, also weighs heavily against allowing LTC facilities and their
staff to screen residents for capacity. Even if the CAT-V is used as the screening
tool, there is a significant likelihood that some persons tested using the
instrument would be erroneously determined to lack capacity to vote. Not only is
the instrument based on a single legal theory of capacity derived from a single
federal district court case' 3-- one with which other courts might disagree'°4-but
whether or not it accurately measures capacity so defined seems ripe for debate.' 5
Consider the first question on the CAT-V: "Imagine that two candidates are
running for Governor of [resident's state], and that today is Election Day in
[resident's state] ....
What will the people of [resident's state] do today to pick
the next Governor?"' 6 An interviewee receives no credit for explaining how a
voter might decide which candidate to vote for. Rather, if the interviewee so
responds, the interviewer is to say, "[w]ell that's how you might decide who you
think should be governor. But how would you actually indicate your choice?"'0 7
An interviewee's response to this question will be used to score his or her
capacity. The interviewee receives a score of "2" for a "completely correct
response," such as: "They will go to the polls and vote" or "Each person will cast
his/her vote for one or the other."'0 8 By comparison, a person who responds,
"That's why we have Election Day," is deemed to have given an "ambiguous or
partially incorrect" response and receives only a "1.' 9 Finally, an "incorrect or
irrelevant response" receives a score of "0.""° Yet whether an answer can be said
to be "incorrect" or "irrelevant" is inherently subjective. As an example of such a
response, the creators give the following: "There's nothing you can do; the TV
guy decides."''. While most Americans would likely find such a response
102. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (declaring the right to vote to be a
"fundamental political right" because it is "preservative of all rights") (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886)); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) ("No right is more precious in a free country than
that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.").
103. Appelbaum, Bonnie & Karlawish, supra note 36 (describing the CAT-V instrument, which attempts to
operationalize the standard for capacity discussed in the Maine District Court case of Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35
(D. Me. 2001)).
104. Cf Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 934-45 (indicating that states have different definitions
of competence).
105. This article's discussion of the CAT-V reflects the version of the CAT-V published in 2005 in the
American Journal of the Psychiatry. See Appelbaum, Bonnie & Karlawish, supra note 36, at 2099 app. 1. It is
the author's understanding that the instrument is in the process of being refined.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
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incorrect, a sizeable number of non-demented citizens might agree with it-at
least with regards to certain media figures."2 Furthermore, such an instrument
would be of no value in determining whether persons unable to express
themselves verbally or in writing but able to communicate through other means,
or persons who have had a stroke or similar condition and are therefore unable to
form sentences, nevertheless retain capacity to vote.
Moreover, even if a fully accurate instrument could be created," 3 erroneous
deprivations of the right to vote could be expected to result from its use. The
responses of a resident believed to be lucid may be perceived to be so even when
the resident is not, and, more importantly, the responses of a resident believed to
be demented may be considered as such even when the resident is not."' As has
been documented in a variety of settings, medical professionals' diagnoses and
assessments can be significantly affected by their expectations."' Staff members'
expectations may, for example, lead them to unconsciously question residents in
residents to respond in a way that confirms those
a manner •that
116 encourages
expectations. Moreover, the relationship between a resident and a staff member
can be a strategic one, with the resident conveying or withholding information to
reach strategic ends. A resident seeking more assistance with activities of daily

112. A common critique of the electoral process, after all, is that the media has undue influence over it.
Moreover, there are regularly complaints that certain members of the media individually exert excessive
influence over the electoral process (e.g., John Prescott Ellis, a cousin to President George W. Bush and then
Fox News commentator, who called the 2000 presidential election for Bush, a move which some say
fundamentally affected the result of the 2000 presidential election; Rupert Murdoch, chairman and chief
executive officer of Fox News, who some commentators believe plays a significant role in the successes of
certain political candidates and parties).
113. Notably, to be fully accurate, an instrument would need to account for the effects that the timing of
testing may have on the quality of the responses given. For example, a test administered when a resident is
experiencing an acute health care event (e.g., a urinary tract infection) may have a very different outcome than
one given at another time. Similarly, a test given in the morning may have different results than one given in the
afternoon.
114. For this reason, the fact that the creators of the CAT-V were able to produce reliable results when
they administered the instrument may not necessarily indicate that facility staff members would be able to do
SO.
115. See Brian H. Bornstein & A. Christine Emler, Rationality in Medical Decision Making: A Review
of the Literature on Doctors' Decision-Making Biases, 7 J. EVALUATION IN CLINICAL PRAC. 99 (2001)
(discussing studies showing that doctors are subject to a "confirmation bias" such that they pay greater attention
to evidence that confirms their expectations than to evidence that would be inconsistent with their expectations);
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH.
175, 192-93 (1998) (discussing the literature on confirmation bias in the context of medical diagnosis as part of
a comprehensive discussion of the literature on confirmation bias).
116. See generally John M. Darley & Russell H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation ProcessesArising in
the Social InteractionSequence, 35 AM. PSYCH. 867 (1980) (describing how self-fulfilling prophesies can arise
in social interaction through a simple process by which the perceiver's expectations about a target lead the
perceiver to act toward the target in way that encourages the target to respond in an expectancy-consistent
manner). Accord John M. Darley & Kathryn 0. Oleson, Introductionto Research on InterpersonalExpectations
47-59, in INTERPERSONAL EXPECTATIONS (Peter David Blanck ed., 1993); Nickerson, supra note 115, at 18182.
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living, for example, may either consciously or unconsciously project greater
needs, helplessness, or confusion in order to obtain greater staff assistance.
The second Mathews factor also looks at the expected value of alternative
procedures. This aspect of the second factor also weighs against allowing LTC
facilities and their staff to screen residents for voting capacity. A more formal
adjudicatory determination, specifically one made by an independent adjudicator
after adequate notice and opportunity for hearing, would be far less likely to
result in an erroneous deprivation of the right to vote. First, such a procedure
would reduce the likelihood that assessments would be compromised either by
staff expectations of residents or by residents' strategic approaches to
communication with staff. Second, it would allow residents to present evidence
of capacity. Residents may have legitimate fears about challenging a staff
member's questions or assessment. For example, nursing home residents depend
on staff members for their most basic needs-from toileting, to ambulating, to
eating-and may legitimately fear retaliation if they object to a staff member's
actions." 7 By comparison, a resident would not have a similar need to please a
neutral, third-party adjudicator and thus would be in a better position to put forth
a vigorous defense. Third, by allowing for the presentation of multiple types of
evidence, a hearing would be more likely to result in an accurate assessment of
voting capacity than would a single assessment. By comparison, a one-shot
assessment may catch the resident at a time when his or her capacity is
temporarily compromised by an acute health event, a medication, or simply the
time of day.
Finally, the government's interest would seem to weigh in favor of a more
robust form of procedure. While allowing facility staff to engage in capacity
testing would reduce the administrative burden required to determine who lacks
capacity to vote, the government has an even greater interest in ensuring free and
fair elections and that citizens are not improperly disenfranchised.' 8
Thus, reviewing the interests involved in light of Mathews and its progeny
leads to the conclusion that even if LTC facility staff determined that a resident
lacks capacity to vote, the facility may not constitutionally deny that person the
right to vote or create significant barriers to exercising that right. As made clear
in the three decades since Mathews, the touchstones of due process are notice and
fair hearing. To deny such a fundamental right as voting without basic notice and
hearing simply does not comport with basic due process protections. At the very
least, voters are entitled to adequate notice and a fair hearing before being denied

117. Cf CARLSON, ADVOCACY, supra note 6, at § 1.05(l) ("Due to the extent of residents' weakness,
and the control exercised by the facility and its staff, residents, family members, and friends often fear that a
complaint made to the facility will lead to retaliation against the resident.").
118. See Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006) ("'A State indisputably has a compelling interest in
preserving the integrity of its election process."') (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489
U.S. 214, 231 (1989)).
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access to the ballot.' 9 In order for the hearing to be fair, it must afford the
resident the right to be heard by a neutral third-party adjudicator before being
deprived of the right to vote.'2 °
It is important to note that a policy conditioning assistance with obtaining or
completing a ballot on an assessment of voting capacity would raise similar due
process concerns, even if the policy stopped short of conditioning the right to
complete a ballot on an assessment of voting capacity. At least for many nursing
home residents, the two approaches are likely to be functionally equivalent as
both would prevent the residents from realizing the right to vote. As previously
discussed, many residents have physical disabilities that prevent them from
successfully independently requesting or marking a ballot. Facility policies and
practices may also make it impractical, if not infeasible, for residents to request
or return an absentee ballot without assistance from staff.
To be sure, if only assistance from staff were conditioned on capacity
assessment, some residents might be able to obtain assistance from other parties.
Yet obtaining such third-party assistance might itself require the assistance of the
facility since facility staff generally control access to outside communication by
setting visitor and telephone access policies, and by delivering and sending all
mail that comes in and out of the facility.
By comparison, a facility may be able to assess residents' voting capacities
for the purpose of recommending an assessment be conducted by a neutral third
party without running afoul of constitutional due process protections. 2 ' However,
this would only be true to the extent that the third-party process would afford
adequate notice and hearing and that no deprivation of voting rights occurred
prior to the third party's determination.
B. Equal Protection Concerns
In addition to raising due process concerns, LTC facilities serving as
gatekeepers to ballot access also raises serious Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection concerns. Of course, in order for equal protection to be implicated,
state action is required. There is no question that a state law requiring LTC
facilities of any type to screen residents for capacity would constitute state
action. As discussed earlier in the context of due process, such screening could

119. Thus, were residency in a LTC facility a factor that, alone or combined with suspicion of
incapacity, triggered high-stakes screening, prospective residents should be given notice of that risk prior to
being admitted to a LTC facility.
120. While ideally this adjudicator would be a member of the judiciary, an administrative procedure
reserving the right to appeal to the courts might be sufficient. See Bell v. Marinko, 235 F. Supp. 2d 772 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (holding that the due process rights of voters whose registrations were challenged on residency
grounds were not violated by an administrative hearing procedure that provided for, among other things, notice,
legal representation, and cross-examination of persons challenging the registrations).
121. Cf Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 973 (suggesting such a use for facility-level capacity
assessments).

1086

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
also constitute "state action" if voluntarily undertaken by LTC facilities because
the qualification and disqualification of voters is a function traditionally reserved
to the government.
The degree of scrutiny that the Supreme Court uses when evaluating whether
a restriction on the franchise of voting is an impermissible violation of
constitutionally guaranteed equal protection depends on the nature of the
restriction. Specifically, as the Supreme Court held in Burdick v. Takushi, 504
U.S. 428 (1992), standard of review when considering a state election law
"depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.' 22 The Burdick Court explained that if a state
election law imposes a "severe" restriction on such rights, "the regulation must
2
be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." 1
However, "when a state election law provision imposes only 'reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of voters, 'the State's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
24
justify' the restrictions."'
Consistent with Burdick, the Supreme Court has found that some provisions
that impact a voter's access to the ballot are subject only to rational basis
review."'2 Nevertheless, some voting restrictions are so severe as to warrant strict
122. 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
123. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
124. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). The Burdick approach continues
to be relied on by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358
(1997) (citing Burdick for the proposition that "[w]hen deciding whether a state election law violates First and
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the 'character and magnitude' of the burden the State's
rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden, and consider the extent
to which the State's concerns make the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs'
rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest.") (citations omitted); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 206 (1999) (Thomas, J. concurring) ("[W]e have developed.., a
framework for assessing the constitutionality, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, of state election
laws. When a State's rule imposes severe burdens on speech or association, it must be narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling interest; lesser burdens trigger less exacting review .... ).
125. Perhaps most notably, in McDonald v. Bd. of Election Conmm'rs of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802 (1969),
the Supreme Court considered the Fourteenth Amendment claims of prisoners awaiting trial in Illinois' Cook
County jail. The prisoners, all eligible Cook County electors, sought absentee ballots due to their physical
inability to appear at the polls on Election Day. At the time, Illinois' absentee ballot statute made no provision
for persons physically present in their county of residence to receive absentee ballots unless the religious
observance precluded their attendance at the polls or they provided proof of physical incapacitation. In
determining whether the Illinois statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court applied rational basis review. The decision to employ rational basis review was based on two key
findings: (1) that the distinctions drawn by the statute were not based on wealth or race, two suspect
classifications that would compel a higher standard of review; and (2) that "there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Illinois statutory scheme has an impact on appellants' ability to exercise the fundamental right
to vote." Id. at 807. But see O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 529 (1974) (invalidating a New York state statute
with close parallels to that at issue in McDonald and distinguishing McDonald on the grounds that the
McDonaldcase involved a "failure of proof' in that the McDonald petitioners had failed to prove that they were
"absolutely prohibited from voting by the State ... since there was the possibility that the State might furnish
some other alternative means of voting"); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973) (finding that McDonald should
not be read as precluding a successful suit by Pennsylvania prisoners who challenged a state absentee ballot
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scrutiny.'26 Strict scrutiny is particularly appropriate where the provision at issue
governs voter qualifications.'27
A requirement that LTC facilities restrict access to ballots-either by
preventing such access or by creating significant barriers to access based on their
assessment of residents' capacities for voting-is a severe restriction on the
franchise. If access to the ballot were conditioned on capacity testing, a person
who failed the test would be completely disenfranchised. There is, of course, no
more severe restriction on the right to vote than the outright denial of that right.
Conditioning voting on capacity testing, however, would also amount to a severe
restriction on the right to vote for people who would pass the test. Capacity
testing is potentially both socially and psychologically costly for would-be
voters.' 28 The voter must subject him or herself to the intrusive and potentially
statute that allegedly created an absolute prohibition on voting by persons confined to penal institutions).
126. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (holding that the Court was required to apply strict
scrutiny where a residency requirement denied some citizens the right to vote); Republican Party of Ark. v.
Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a political party's equal
protection challenge of a law that required parties seeking to place candidates on the general election ballot to
conduct and pay for a primary election); Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying strict
scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to a Virginia law that required voters to supply their social security
number in order to register to vote); Manhattan State Citizens' Group, Inc. v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (applying strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge to a New York state law that
prohibited persons adjudicated incompetent or involuntarily committed to a mental institution from voting). See
also Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 212-19 (Mo. 2006) (finding that a state statute requiring voters to
present "a Missouri driver's license, a Missouri non-driver's license, or a United States passport on election day
in order to vote" violated the Equal Protection Clause of Missouri's constitution).
127. See Greidinger, 988 F.2d at 1349 (finding that a Virginia law that required voters to supply their
social security number in order to register to vote was unconstitutional in that it did not satisfy strict scrutiny,
and noting that "[iun the context of voter qualifications, traditional equal protection strict scrutiny analysis has
been applied."). See also Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 (applying strict scrutiny to a residency requirement); Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 297 (1975) (in holding unconstitutional a city law limiting voting on city bond issues to
persons who had "rendered" property for taxation, stating that "as long as the election in question is not one of
special interest, any classification restricting the franchise on grounds other than residence, age, and citizenship
cannot stand unless the district or State can demonstrate that the classification serves a compelling state
interest"); Manhattan State Citizens' Group, 524 F. Supp. at 1274-75 (using strict scrutiny analysis to find that a
state law violated equal protection requirements insofar as it disenfranchised all persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution); Michael Waterstone, Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People
with Disabilities, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 353, 373-74 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court is "reticent to
strike down state statutes or practices that it feels only impact the 'administration' of elections" but is relatively
more willing to strike down state laws that have a substantial impact on the right to vote). Cf Weinschenk, 203
S.W.3d at 212, 219 (finding that a state statute requiring voters to present "a Missouri driver's license, a
Missouri non-driver's license, or a United States passport on election day in order to vote" violated the Equal
Protection Clause of Missouri's constitution); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (holding that regardless of whether or not strict scrutiny was the proper standard, a challenge to a
photographic identification requirement for voting was likely to succeed because the burden of the requirement
imposed was sufficiently severe and the law was not sufficiently tailored to the state's purported interest). But
see Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that an Indiana statute
requiring persons voting at the polls to show photographic identification did not impermissibly burden the right
to vote).
128. Such costs must be taken into account when considering whether a restriction on the right to vote is
severe. Cf Greidinger, 988 F.2d at 1352-55 (examining in depth the costs of disclosing one's social security
number under a Virginia law that required voters to supply their social security number in order to register to
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demeaning process of having his or her mental capacity challenged and, at least
under the CAT-V, must reveal how he or she would make a voting choice. The
later intrusion would significantly undermine one of the fundamental rights
afforded to other voters: the right to privacy as to one's political views and
beliefs.
Since conditioning the right to vote on capacity testing is a severe restriction
on Fourteenth Amendment rights, strict scrutiny applies. In determining whether
strict scrutiny is satisfied, the first question is whether the state has a compelling
interest in preventing persons who lack the capacity to understand the nature of
the vote and the electoral process from voting. It seems likely that the courts
would find this to be a compelling interest. After all, the Supreme Court recently
declared in Purcell v. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. 5 (2006), that "[a] State indisputably
' 29
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election process. ,,
However, in Purcell, the Court equated the integrity of the system with a lack of
fraud. 3 There is a legitimate question as to whether allowing persons who lack
the capacity to vote to participate in the process would, like fraud, undermine the
integrity of the electoral process. Under our current system, a person is permitted
to cast a vote for any candidate for any reason-regardless of whether that reason
be wise, informed, or even rational. Moreover, "[lit is well established that when
a restriction 'severely' limits fundamental voting rights, courts must assess the
state's interests in doing so with great care.''' 3 '
Even assuming arguendo that the first part of the strict scrutiny test is
satisfied because the state has a compelling interest in preventing voting by
persons lacking the capacity to understand the nature of the vote and the electoral
process, there is reason to question whether a high-stakes gate-keeping
requirement would be sufficiently tailored to meet that interest. One reason to
believe it would not be sufficiently tailored is that selectively restricting the
voting rights of institutionalized LTC residents is grossly under-inclusive since it
targets only a small subset of persons with dementia. While a state may be able to
bar "less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise,"' 32 under
certain circumstances, selectively pursuing this aim may result in an equal
protection violation. In Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of Tennessee's waiting period imposed on
new residents' right to vote. Tennessee had attempted to justify the waiting
period as furthering the state's interest in an intelligent, knowledgeable

vote and finding the law unconstitutional because it imposed a severe burden on the right to vote).
129.

127 S. Ct. 5, 7 (2006).

130. Id. ("Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential to the functioning of our
participatory democracy. Voter fraud drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and breeds distrust of

our government.").
131. Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 857 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a violation of constitutional due process
where voters approved a ballot proposition without adequate notification that approval of the proposition would
impose lifetime term limits on elected officials, thereby limiting voters' fundamental right to vote).
132.

See generally Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 356-57 (1972).
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electorate. The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument. The Court noted
that "the criterion of 'intelligent' voting is an elusive one, and susceptible of
abuse."' 3 3 Declining to determine whether a State could ever bar "less
knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise," the Court instead
concluded that Tennessee could not selectively pursue this interest with respect
only to new arrivals. 34 Although Dunn does not speak to whether strict scrutiny
would apply in the case at hand, as the Dunn case implicated not only the right to
vote but also the right to travel between states, the Court's reasoning suggests
that selectively targeting nursing home residents for capacity testing might run
afoul of equal protection requirements by being too under-inclusive.
Defining the compelling interest as preventing voter fraud instead of
preventing persons with insufficient capacity from voting does not avoid the
equal protection problem. This is because a policy of restricting the rights of LTC
facility residents by imposing gate-keeping requirements also cannot be
reasonably said to be narrowly tailored to meet this interest. In general, a law is
narrowly tailored to prevent voting fraud if it creates "the least restrictive means
necessary for preventing fraud."' 35 As discussed earlier, there is little evidence of
voting fraud occurring in LTC facilities, the evidence that exists is largely
anecdotal, and the evidence which exists suggests, at most, isolated-as opposed
to systemic-instances of fraud. More importantly, the fraud that does occur does
not appear to target LTC residents based on their individual mental capacities,
but rather on their group status as LTC residents. Furthermore, as is discussed in
more depth subsequently, empowering LTC facility staff as gatekeepers is likely
to increase fraud, not reduce it. Such a policy creates entirely new opportunities
and justifications for unaccountable parties to improperly deny ballot access."'
Just as the due process problems posed by facility gate-keeping cannot be
averted by "simply" requiring that assistance with obtaining and completing the
ballot-and not the right to complete the ballot-be conditioned on capacity
assessment, the equal protection concerns raised by such gate-keeping also
cannot be averted in this manner. The Fourteenth Amendment not only protects
voters' right to access the ballot, but also their right to obtain the assistance
needed to complete the ballot.' 3' Allowing only certain groups of voters to receive
133. Id. at 356.
134. See id. at 356-60.
135. See id. at 353.
136. It is important to recognize that fraud can occur not only by casting improper ballots but also by
preventing proper ballots from being cast.
137. See James v. Humphreys County Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 384 F. Supp. 114, 132 (D. Miss. 1974)
("[N]o compelling reason exists for the election officials in Humphreys County to adhere to practices which
distinguish between voter assistance offered to illiterates and that allowed to the blind and disabled. Since
Mississippi's election laws expressly permit optional assistance for the blind and disabled voters, the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates that like optional assistance be extended to illiterate voters."); O'Neal v. Simpson, 350
So. 2d 998 (Miss. 1977) (using rational basis review to determine whether a statutory scheme that placed
greater restrictions on assistance to illiterate voters than on assistance to blind or disabled voters denied illiterate
voters equal protection of law).
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assistance raises serious constitutional concerns. At least for some individuals,
denying assistance with ballot completion may severely burden the right to vote.
The burden resulting from lack of assistance may be severe because of the
person's physical status. For example, denying assistance to a bed-bound resident
unable to hold a writing utensil is likely to render the resident entirely unable to
vote. However, a denial of assistance may also impose a severe burden on the
right to vote simply because of the person's residential status. For example, a
voter confined to a LTC facility may be unable to obtain a ballot or to return a
ballot without having a third party deliver or send mail for him or her.
The equal protection concerns raised by requiring capacity testing can also
not be averted by "only" using them to determine which residents should have
their voting capacity formally adjudicated.'38 While the process might be
superior, it would still have the clear result of singling out the LTC population
for a severe burden on the right to vote. Under such a scheme, LTC residents'
institutional status would still result in both the burden of having their capacity
tested and potentially the burden of outright disenfranchisement.
Finally, to fully understand the potential viability of an equal protection
challenge to gate-keeping by LTC facilities, it is important to recognize that the
Supreme Court has historically been receptive to voting rights claims that focus
on the degrading effects of the denial of voting rights. In a sweeping analysis of
Supreme Court voting rights jurisprudence in a 1997 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review article, James Gardner recognized that the Court tends to speak of
the value of the vote "almost exclusively in terms of its liberty-protective
properties"-that is, its ability to allow citizens to protect their interests by
influencing government decision-making.' 39 However, Gardner found that the
Court has been relatively hostile to claims actually based on theories of
protective democracy. 40 By contrast, Gardner found that the Court has
historically been receptive to voting rights claims based on "communitarian
grounds"-that is, on the grounds that voting is a socially validating process and
that exclusion from the franchise is "a mark of inferiority, a consignment to a
degrading form of second-class citizenship."' 4' This jurisprudential tendency
suggests that the Court might be quite sympathetic to an equal protection claim
brought by LTC residents arguing that barriers to exercising the franchise were
being exclusively or disproportionately imposed on them and that this further
stigmatized and marginalized them within their larger community.

138. Cf.Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 87, at 973.
139. See James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence:
A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 899 (1997).
140. Id. at 899, 906-41.
141. Id. at 901-02, 906-41 (arguing that "the plaintiffs most likely to meet with success as Supreme
Court litigants are those who base their claims on communitarian theories [of democracy]-those who
complain, that is, of being stigmatized by some demeaning form of exclusion from the community's political
life.").
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C. Statutory Concerns
Constitutional concerns aside, requiring or permitting LTC facilities and their
staff to serve as gatekeepers to the ballot runs contrary to the aims of a wide variety
of federal statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Help
America Vote Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Nursing Home Reform Act of
1987.
A gate-keeping provision would most directly conflict with the Nursing Home
Reform Act of 1987. Under the Nursing Home Reform Act and its implementing
regulations, a nursing home resident residing in a facility that is certified to receive
either Medicaid or Medicare funding has "the right to exercise his or her rights as a
resident of the facility and as a citizen or resident of the United States" and "the
right to be free of interference, coercion, discrimination, and reprisal from the
facility in exercising his or her rights.' 42 Under the law, nursing home residents
also have the fight to "reside and receive services in the facility with reasonable
accommodation of individual needs and preferences, except where the health or
By
safety of the individual or other residents would be endangered .... ,,'4'
screening nursing home residents for capacity, staff would directly undermine
residents' fight to be free from interference in exercising their fight to vote. A
limitation on assistance with ballot completion might also implicate residents'
rights to have their needs and preferences accommodated.
Whether facility screening would implicate the Voting Rights Act of 1964
(VRA) requires a somewhat more complicated analysis as it could implicate two
separate types of prohibitions found in the VRA: (1) prohibitions against
discrimination on the basis of race, and (2) prohibitions against certain potentially
discriminatory procedures and practices.
Section 1973 of the VRA prohibits voting standards, practices, and procedures
that discriminate on the basis of, among other things, race or color.'" In 1982,
Congress amended the VRA to allow a plaintiff to establish a violation of the VRA
without proving a discriminatory purpose. Today, a plaintiff may show a violation
of the VRA simply by showing that, based on the "totality of [the] circumstances,"
a challenged voting practice discriminates on the basis of race.' 4 5 The VRA has
been used successfully to challenge at-large elections and multi-member districts
that have the effect of diluting minority votes.' 46 Arguably, creating barriers to
voting specific to nursing home residents could be seen as a violation of the VRA

142. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10(a)(l)-(2) (2006).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A)(v)(I) (2000) (applying to nursing facilities); 42 U.S.C. § 1395i39(c)(1)(A)(v)(l) (2000) (applying to skilled nursing facilities); 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(e)(1) (2006). The language
in both statutes and in their common regulation is essentially identical.
144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(a) (West 2003).
145. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973(b) (West 2003). See also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38 (1986);
Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003).
146. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77-80 (upholding district court's finding of a Section 2 violation where
a multi-member districting plan had been found to dilute minority voting rights).
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on similar grounds. Since within any major age group blacks are more likely than
whites to reside in nursing homes, creating nursing home resident-specific voting
barriers can be expected to disproportionately increase the cost of voting for black
voters of a given age relative to white voters of the same age. Nevertheless, similar
arguments have been made challenging felon disenfranchisement laws with only
limited success, 147 and the argument for violation here is not as strong as it is in the
felon disenfranchisement cases: the total impact is smaller because the number of
individuals affected is smaller, the barrier does not necessarily amount to a total
denial of the franchise, and-perhaps most importantly-relative to the overall
population, the nursing home population is disproportionately white. Thus, courts
that reject the argument in the context of felon disenfranchisement can be expected
to reject it here too, and even those courts that have been receptive to the felon
disenfranchisement argument may not be willing to extend the reach of the VRA to
cover this new possibility. 48 Accordingly, it seems unlikely that high-stakes
screening of LTC residents for voting capacity would be found to run afoul of the
VRA on the grounds that it discriminates on the basis of race.
By contrast, creating nursing home-specific barriers would likely violate
Section 1971 of the VRA, which states that:
[n]o person acting under color of law shall.., in determining whether any
individual is qualified under State law or laws to vote in any election,
apply any standard, practice, or procedure different from the standards,
practices, or procedures applied under such law or laws to other
individuals within the same county, parish, or similar political subdivision
who have been found by State officials to be qualified to vote .... 149

147. See Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc) (affirming the district court's
dismissal of a VRA challenge to a New York felon disenfranchisement statute); Johnson v. Governor of Fla.,
405 F.3d 1214 (1 lth Cir. 2005) (holding that Florida's felon disenfranchisement law did not violate either the
VRA or Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantees); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986)
(finding that Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement law, which disproportionately disenfranchised minorities,
did not violate either Section 2 of the VRA or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). But
see Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1016 (stating that "[a]lthough states may deprive felons of the right to vote without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment, when felon disenfranchisement results in denial of the right to vote or
vote dilution on account of race or color, Section 2 affords disenfranchised felons the means to seek redress"
and remanding for further proceedings) (citations omitted).
148. In upholding one such challenge, the Ninth Circuit conceded that "a bare statistical showing of
disproportionate impact on a racial minority" is insufficient to establish a Section 2 violation but found that a
Section 2 violation may be found if "the discriminatory impact of a challenged voting practice is attributable to
racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances." Farrakhan, 338 F.3d at 1019
(emphasis in original). Specifically, in Farrakhan,the Ninth Circuit remanded for new proceedings because the
district court failed to consider "evidence of discrimination within the criminal justice system"-evidence that
the Ninth Circuit held "can be relevant to a Section 2 analysis." Id. at 1012. Translated into the nursing home
context, a successful challenge to nursing home-specific barriers to voting might well require a showing that
policies providing for the financing of long-term care in the United States discriminate against minorities.
149. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(a)(2)(A) (West 2003).
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Selectively testing the capacity of LTC residents would be applying different
standards, practices, and procedures to this population. Similarly, to the extent
that capacity-testing instruments could be construed to be "literacy tests," they
the VRA specifically prohibits selective
would also be unlawful because
50
employment of literacy tests.'
In addition to potentially limiting states' abilities to selectively target LTC
residents, the VRA limits states' abilities to deny affirmative assistance with
ballot completion to such residents. Under the VRA, "[a]ny voter who requires
assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write
may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's
,,151
employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union.
Accordingly, a state might not able to condition LTC residents' ability to obtain
assistance with ballot completion on residents agreeing to subject themselves to
informal capacity assessments without violating the VRA.
Allowing or requiring LTC facilities to engage in high-stakes gate-keeping
might also be found to violate Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). Title II declares that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity."' 52 Its implementing regulations further
prohibit public entities from using eligibility criteria that tend to screen out
disabled individuals from such services, programs, or activities unless the criteria
are "necessary."'' 53 For reasons previously discussed, using residence in a LTC
institution as a criterion for (or even as a factor contributing to) the imposition of
high-stakes capacity testing is not necessary to protect the integrity of the
electoral process. Accordingly, conditioning the ability of LTC residents to vote
on capacity testing might well be determined to be unlawful discrimination on
the basis of disability. The case law in this area is still in its infancy, however,
and plaintiffs arguing that the ADA regulates states' freedom to condition the
right to vote on the basis of mental incompetence have met with only limited
54
To the extent that an ADA claim might succeed, so too might a claim
success.'

150. See id. § 197 1(a)(2)(C)(i) (prohibiting any person "acting under color of law" from "employ[ing]
any literacy test as a qualification for voting in any election unless ... such test is administered to each
individual and is conducted wholly in writing ....
151. Id. § 1973aa-6.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). A person is a "qualified individual with a disability" if he or she is "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices...
meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity." Id. § 12131(2). An individual with a disability, in turn, includes one with
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities as well as one who is
regarded as having such an impairment. See id. § 12101(2).
153. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (2006).
154. See Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 59 (D. Me. 2001) (finding that a state law disenfranchising
persons subject to guardianship violated Title H of the ADA). But see Prye v. Carnahan, No. 04-4248-CV-CODS, 2006 WL 1888639, *5-7, *19 (W.D. Mo. July 7,2006) (finding that the ADA was not violated by a state
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that such gate-keeping violates Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,1"5
which prohibits federally-funded
programs and activities from discriminating on
56
the basis of disability.
While it is thus an open question whether the ADA could be successfully used to
prevent LTC facilities from serving as gatekeepers, it is clear that attempts to impose
high-stakes gate-keeping would run contrary to the aims of the ADA. The ADA is
premised on the notion that Congress should work to counteract society's tendency
to "isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities" including in the areas of
"institutionalization, health services, [and] voting .... The ADA and subsequent
case law interpreting its provisions reflect an increasingly widespread understanding
that persons with disabilities are entitled to reside in the most integrated setting
reasonably possible. Restricting fundamental rights based in part on a disabled
person's institutional placement thus runs contrary to the ADA's basic tenets.
Such gate-keeping also runs contrary to the more recent Help America Vote Act
(HAVA), although HAVA does not appear to directly prohibit LTC facilities from
serving as gatekeepers. HAVA, passed in a climate of significant concern about
access to the ballot following the 2000 presidential election fiasco, 58 requires states
to take affirmative action to make polling places accessible to voters with
disabilities. 5 9 While HAVA does not address absentee balloting or other forms of
",

law prohibiting persons under a full order of protection from voting so long as "[tihe evidence in a particular
case persuades a probate court that a person is mentally incapacitated as to some matters but not incapacitated
with respect to his or her ability to vote, the court is to enter an order tailored to reflect this finding.").
155. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1999 & Supp. 2007).
156. See Douglas v. Cal. Dep't of Youth Auth., 285 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The ADA has
no federal funding requirement, but it is otherwise similar in substance to the Rehabilitation Act, and 'cases
interpreting either are applicable and interchangeable."') (quoting Allison v. Dep't of Corrections, 94 F.3d 494,
497 (8th Cir. 1996)); Sutton v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1207-08 n.5 (llth Cir. 1999) ("The standard for
determining liability under the Rehabilitation Act is the same as that under the ADA."); McDonald v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding the same standards apply to both
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims); Prye, 2006 WL 1888639, at *5 (In a case challenging a state law
disenfranchising all person under a full order of guardianship, stating that "Plaintiffs raise claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act. These statutes are similar in all pertinent
respects and caselaw interpreting one may be used to interpret the other.").
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l)-(3) (2000). Under the ADA, public entities must not exclude the
disabled, by reason of their disability, from services or benefits. See id. § 12132 ("[N]o qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.").
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court held in Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), a state may
not require persons with mental health needs to have those needs met in an institutional setting where a less
restrictive setting can reasonably be made available.
158. See Arlene Kanter & Rebecca Russo, The Right of People with Disabilities to Exercise Their Right
to Vote Under the Help America Vote Act, 30 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 852 (2006). For a more
complete history of HAVA, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement,and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206 (2005).
159. Under HAVA, states receiving HAVA funds must provide voting systems at polling places that are
"accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually
impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and
independence) as for other voters." See 42 U.S.C. § 1548 1(a)(3)(A) (2000).
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voting that might occur outside of polling places,"'6 it reflects an understanding that a
person's disabilities should not limit his or her right to vote on the same terms as
other voters.
In sum, either requiring or permitting nursing homes to serve as gatekeepers
would be inconsistent with the Nursing Home Reform Act and may potentially
violate the ADA. Conditioning assistance with ballot completion on capacity
assessment may also violate the VRA. In addition, the spirit of each of these statutory
schemes,6 as well as that of HAVA, would be undermined by such high-stakes gatekeeping.
D. Policy Concerns
As the preceding sections make clear, requiring or allowing LTC facilities
and their staff to serve as gatekeepers raises serious legal concerns. Even aside
from these legal issues, however, requiring or permitting LTC facilities and their
staff to serve as gatekeepers to the ballot is simply bad policy. Treating residents
of LTC institutions differently from other persons for purposes of access to
voting not only unfairly targets a marginalized, segregated, and already
stigmatized population with common interests, but also invites significantly more
fraud than it would discourage.
1. Gross Under-Inclusiveness
While LTC facilities concentrate persons with dementia, the vast majority of
persons with dementia reside in community-based settings. Instituting capacity
testing for residents of LTC institutions and not for similarly situated persons in
community-based settings is thus under-inclusive.
The mere fact that targeting LTC residents would be an under-inclusive
approach to policymaking is not in and of itself a basis for concern. Governments
need some discretion in regulating social problems. As is well recognized in the
context of entitlement statutes, to require perfect precision would be to create a
potentially insurmountable hurdle to well-meaning policies that significantly
address important social problems. However, under-inclusiveness in entitlement
programs is different than under-inclusiveness in programs or policies that limit
preexisting liberty interests and fundamental rights. Laws and practices that
impose significant burdens on the liberty interests and fundamental rights of
marginalized, disempowered populations but not on similarly situated
mainstreamed populations raise serious ethical and political concerns. Rather

160. See § 1548 1(a)(3).
161. The VRA, HAVA, and the ADA are not, of course, the only federal statutes whose sentiments to
which a policy restricting the voting rights of LTC residents would run contrary. For example, a stated purpose
of the Federal Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and Handicapped Act is "improving access for handicapped
and elderly individuals to registration facilities and polling places for Federal elections." Id. § 1973ee.
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than reflecting legitimate, piecemeal approaches to policymaking or program
design, such laws may represent a form of majority tyranny: policymakers
imposing burdens on marginalized populations that they could not or would not
impose on politically empowered populations.
Residents of LTC facilities are a classic example of a disempowered and
marginalized population. Not only are residents of LTC facilities physically
segregated from the mainstream population and physically feeble, but their
residence in a LTC facility carries with it significant stigma. 62 That stigma, and
the extent to which institutionalization undermines residents' sense of dignity,
'6
can only be expected to increase if residents are singled out for capacity testing. 1
Moreover, as previously discussed, the nursing home sub-population of the LTC
resident population is disproportionately comprised of other marginalized
populations.
Even beyond the moral implications of targeting this type of marginalized
population, the under-inclusiveness of the approach has implications for the
democratic system. When a certain group's views are diluted, there is a potential
for a less representative and less legitimate government to result. The right to
vote is a citizen's primary manner of exerting political power. For LTC residents
weakened by age and frailty, it may be the only opportunity to exert such power.
Moreover, since LTC residents tend to share important common interests (e.g.,
interests in high quality long-term care and in high levels of funding for the
Medicaid program), barriers to exerting such power are not only an affront to
their individual rights as citizens, but also impede their ability to defend or
promote their collective interests.
2.

Invitationfor Fraud

Allowing or encouraging LTC facilities to use capacity testing to limit
residents' ballot access invites fraud. A review of existing reports of fraudulent
voting practices in the nation's LTC facilities suggests that most fraud occurs
with the involvement of at least some facility staff. Voting fraud could therefore
be expected to increase if staff members were granted formal authority to engage

162. Placement in a LTC facility, especially a nursing home, is often seen by residents and potential
residents as a sign of decline and frailty. For some, it is also an indicator of failure, whether that be the failure to
stay physically or mentally healthy, the failure to financially provide for alternative forms of care, the failure in
interpersonal relations and securing community-based support from family or friends, or some combination of
the three.
163. Cf Waterstone, supra note 127, 365-66 (arguing that treating the disabled citizens differently from
other citizens in terms of voting procedures and access is problematic not only from an "instrumentalist" point
of view, but also from an "equal dignity" perspective as such distinctions perpetrate negative stereotypes of this
minority group). There is reason to believe that this type of argument might resound with the court system. See
Gardner, supra note 139, at 901-02 (arguing that "the plaintiffs most likely to meet with success as Supreme
Court litigants are those who base their claims on communitarian theories [of democracy]-those who
complain, that is, of being stigmatized by some demeaning form of exclusion from the community's political
life.").

1097

2007 /Preserving Voting Rights in Long-Term Care Institutions

in high-stakes capacity testing. Such authority would provide a convenient
mechanism for a staff member with improper motivations to justify the denial of
the ballot to a person whom the staff member believes will vote in a manner of
which or for a candidate of whom the staff member disapproves. Arming staff
members with more robust capacity testing instruments would add credibility to
staff determinations, regardless of the correctness of those determinations.
Moreover, without an open hearing, there would be virtually no way for an
improperly disenfranchised resident to challenge the legitimacy of a staff
member's determination even if the resident were willing to do so.
Even staff members without an intent to commit fraud might be tempted to
improperly disenfranchise residents. A staff member assessing whether a person
has the capacity to vote might be influenced by the resident's response to the
question of how he or she would vote. Suppose, for example, a facility social
worker administers the CAT-V to a bigoted resident and, in so doing, poses the
following question:
Let me ask you to imagine the following about the two candidates who
are running. Candidate A thinks the state should be doing more to
provide health insurance to people who don't have it and should be
spending more money on schools. He is willing to raise taxes to get the
money to do these things. Candidate B says the government should not
provide health insurance but should make it easier for employers to offer
it. He believes that the schools have enough money already but need
tighter controls to make sure they use it properly. He is against raising
taxes. Based on what I just told you, which candidate do you think you
are more likely to vote for: A or B? '
Suppose the resident responds: "Whichever one is white. I don't vote for
[racial epithet]." This response would evidence the ability to make a choice,
which is what the question is designed to assess. 165 Yet it would be easy for the
social worker who was offended or otherwise disturbed by the response to
categorize it as "incorrect" or "unresponsive" because it was not based on facts
that were part of the fact pattern.
E. Election Officials and Capacity Testing
Having concluded that LTC facilities and their staff should not condition
residents' access to the ballot on any form of capacity assessment, the natural
question is whether some other person or entity should do so. It has been
suggested that election officials are the most suitable choice.' 66 Underlying this

164.
165.
166.
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argument appears to be the assumption that someone must or will capacity-test
residents in order to ensure the integrity of the electoral process and that the
primary questions are who should do it and how.
To be sure, the government is constitutionally entitled to deny the right to
vote to persons lacking capacity to vote. Under current law, such disenfranchisement would most naturally occur through the guardianship system. While
guardianship procedures vary significantly from state to state, in most states, any
person with an interest in an allegedly incapacitated person (ALP), including a
residential care facility, can petition the appropriate court system to have the AlP
declared incompetent. As part of this adjudication, the court may declare the AIP
to be legally incompetent to vote and thus make it unlawful for the AIP to vote.
Realistically, however, the guardianship system is not an effective way to restrict
the voting rolls to those with capacity to vote. It is a time- and resource-intensive
process, 67 and no one person is likely to have sufficient incentive to initiate a
guardianship proceeding simply to prevent an allegedly incapacitated person
from voting.
The failure of the guardianship system to serve as a mechanism to
disenfranchise persons lacking capacity to vote does not mean, however, that
election officials should screen voters for voting capacity. As previously
discussed, to deny a citizen the right to vote without first providing adequate
notice and pre-deprivation hearing rights not only runs afoul of constitutional due
process protections, but is likely to result in more erroneous deprivations of that
right than would a system providing for notice and pre-deprivation hearing. To
the extent that screening by election officials would target LTC residents, it
would raise the same-if not stronger-equal protection concerns as screening
conducted by LTC facilities. Moreover, high-stakes screening by election
officials threatens the integrity of the electoral process by creating opportunities
for election officials to disenfranchise persons-in this case, an already
marginalized group of persons with common interests and potentially common
voting patterns-with little accountability. The fact that many election officials
are partisan makes this especially problematic.
If voting by incapacitated persons is truly a concern, systems that provide
adequate notice and pre-deprivation hearing rights to all persons who allegedly
lack voting capacity-not just those in institutional settings-could be adopted.
For example, Australia provides a simple, administrative procedure with predeprivation notice and hearing rights by which an allegedly incapacitated person
may be removed from the country's voting rolls. Under the Australian Electoral
Act of 1907, either another voter or an election official may object to the
"enrollment" on the election rolls of any voter on the basis of mental incapacity.

167.

Cf Lawrence A. Frolik, Promoting Judicial Acceptance and Use of Limited Guardianship, 31

STETSON L. REV. 735, 740-41 (2002) (noting that reforms designed to protect allegedly incapacitated persons

from unnecessary rights deprivations have made the guardianship system increasingly costly and timeconsuming).
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The Electoral Commission is entitled to remove the person's name from the roll
only after the allegedly incapacitated voter is served with written notice and is
given the opportunity to object to such removal.' 6 The challenged voter may
object either in writing, in person, or through an agent. '69
V. RECOMMENDED APPROACH

A.

PublicResponsibilities

LTC facilities cannot, and should not, be required to assume full
responsibility for ensuring that residents are able to vote and are not targets of
election fraud. Rather, all states should adopt legislation providing for election
officials to conduct absentee balloting in LTC facilities. Not only would such an
approach protect against fraudulent voting practices, but it would expand access
to the ballot. Indeed, a study of the voting behavior of nursing home residents in
two Maryland counties suggests that such legislation would likely lead to more
residents who wish to vote being able to do so.17
In designing policies for conducting absentee balloting in LTC facilities,
states should first examine existing state laws that may pose undue barriers to
voting by LTC residents. For example, unnecessarily restrictive residency
requirements, election laws that prohibit a LTC facility staff member from
assisting with the completion of multiple absentee ballots, and voter identification requirements may impose disproportionate burdens on LTC residents.
Accordingly, if a state chooses to impose such barriers on the general population,
it might nevertheless be appropriate to make an exception for LTC residents.' 7'
Having examined their own laws, states should then look to their sister states
that currently have statutes and regulations that provide for election officials'
involvement in absentee balloting. States with such policies differ in the types of
institutions to which their absentee voting policies apply.'12 Ideally, statutes
providing for the administration of absentee balloting should cover all residential
institutions in which significant portions of residents are likely to have physical
limitations that make voting at the polls unrealistic. This would not only include
nursing homes, but also residential facilities that tend to fall under the label of

168. See Electoral Act 1907, §§ 48, 51A (Austl.).
169. See id. § 48(2)(e).
170. In the Maryland study, nursing home residents in a county in which the Board of Elections
instigated and conducted voting in nursing homes were found to vote at a greater rate than residents in a county
in which the Board of Elections did not involve itself in conducting balloting in nursing homes. See O'Sullivan,
supra note 50, at 343.
171. For example, LTC residents are less likely than the general population to have a valid form of
photo identification. In states with voter identification requirements, it might therefore be appropriate to allow a
facility's identification of a resident in lieu of photo identification.
172. See Smith & Sabatino, supra note 60, at 6-7.
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assisted living. A broad definition would help ensure that similarly situated
individuals are provided with similar supports and protections.
Another important consideration when designing absentee balloting protocols
is the trigger for election official involvement. Currently, triggers vary
significantly from state to state."3 Depending on the state, election official
involvement may be triggered by a certain number of voters residing in an
institution;• •114 by
a 175certain number of absentee ballots being requested
by
•
• •
176 residents
of an institution; by a request of a voter residing in the facility; or, by a
request of the institution.'

While each approach is not without its advantages,

ideally states would provide for election official involvement to assist any time a
properly registered voter resides in a qualifying institution. Given limited
resources, however, states might reasonably limit election official involvement to
those institutions in which a certain threshold number of registered voters (e.g.,
five registered voters) reside. Regardless of the threshold number, it is important
that the threshold be based on registration figures as opposed to requests for
absentee ballots or individual voter or facility requests for involvement. After all,
one of the reasons for election official involvement is to enable registered voters
to vote regardless of whether such voters are in a position to independently
request an absentee ballot and regardless of whether LTC facility staff believe
such voters should vote.
Yet another consideration is the identity of the election officials who assist

with ballot completion. Many states with provisions for election officials to
conduct absentee balloting in LTC facilities have attempted to guard against
partisan behavior by creating procedural safeguards. For example, in Illinois and
Minnesota, such balloting is to be conducted by two election judges, each from
173. See id.
174. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-159q, 9-159r(a) (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (stating that where
twenty or more electors reside in a facility, absentee balloting shall be conducted under the supervision of the
registrar of voters).
175. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-8-112 (West 2004) (stating that election assistance by an appointed
bipartisan committee is to be provided where "more than five absentee ballots are to be sent to the same group
residential facility within a county"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 53.22.1.b (West 1999) (stating that two election
officers shall deliver the absentee ballot to any resident who has requested one and assist with ballot completion
if a request is made); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 8-407 (McKinney 2007) (stating that bipartisan boards shall conduct
voting in long-term care facilities from which at least twenty-five applications for absentee ballots from eligible
voters have been received or, at the option of the County, where any application for an absentee ballot has been
received); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-19-9.1 (1995 & Supp. 2003) (stating that representatives of the auditor's
office will deliver ballots to and assist with ballot completion at any nursing facility, assisted living facility, or
hospital from which "there might reasonably be expected to be five or more absentee ballot applications"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 6.875 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (stating that special voting deputies shall provide ballots and
assist with ballot completion where one or more qualified voters residing in a facility requests an absentee
ballot).
176. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14-115 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (stating that, at the request of a
voter, the absentee voting board will deliver the absentee ballot and return it following completion).
177. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.655 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007) (stating that supervisor of elections is
required to provide election supervision where a facility administrator has requested it; the supervisor is also
permitted to provide supervision where no request has been made).
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different political parties.' Consistent with these approaches, election officials
who conduct absentee balloting should do so in bipartisan teams regardless of
whether they are paid employees or unpaid volunteers. Bipartisan teams not only
help protect the integrity of the election process, 7 9 but also protect residents'
votes by giving an impression of integrity, thus discouraging partisan challenges
that could effectively disenfranchise LTC voters.
Having discussed where, when, and what kind of election officials should be
made available, we come to the more pressing and complicated question of what
role such officials should play. A superior approach to having facility staff assist
with ballot completion is one that has been adopted by many states: providing
bipartisan election officials to assist LTC residents who are unable to
independently complete ballots. Providing bipartisan election officials to assist
with ballot completion not only helps residents complete their ballots, but also
protects their right to have their votes counted, much like providing bipartisan
election officials to supervise balloting protects that right.
Election officials providing assistance should not limit their assistance
simply because they suspect that a resident is confused or suffering from
dementia. 80 Rather, so long as the resident is able to request assistance and
clearly indicate a voting decision, assistance should be provided. Of course, at
times, the determination of what constitutes a clear indication of a voting
decision may require election officials to make a subjective, case-specific
judgment. Accordingly, it would be prudent for states to develop guidelines for
election officials in order to help them make consistent determinations as to
whether a resident's communication constitutes a sufficiently clear voting
decision. Despite the potential for subjective determinations, however, election
officials should not be permitted to infer a voting decision from a resident's
ambiguous statement. Although disallowing such inferences may have the effect
of disenfranchising certain residents who are inarticulate or who lack critical
language skills due to disability, such a limitation is necessary to ensure that it is
the resident, and not the official, who is making the voting decision.'8'
Regardless of the precise practices and standards adopted by states, it is
critical that the practices provide for transparency and accountability.
178. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/19-12.2 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203B.11 (West 2006).
179. Even with bipartisan teams, fraud may occur. For example, pursuant to an Ohio law permitting
election board members to assist physically infirm voters, an Ohio county election board sent two employees
(Democrat Linda Weaver and Republican John Jackson) to a Cleveland nursing home to assist residents with
ballot completion. Weaver suspected that Jackson was marking ballots contrary to residents' intentions. Weaver
reported her suspicions and Jackson was eventually criminally indicted on five counts of ballot tampering and
one count of election misconduct. See State v. Jackson, 811 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio 2004). However, as State v.
Jackson shows, such bipartisan teams increase the chance that if fraud does occur, it will be uncovered.
180. Should a state adopt a court procedure for disenfranchising persons on the basis of incapacity,
election officials who suspect that a resident lacks capacity would presumably be able to report their suspicions
to the proper authority and a proceeding could be initiated.
181. Of course, where feasible and of value to the resident, assistive technologies should be made
available to help residents with limited language skills to adequately communicate their voting choices.
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Transparent and accountable practices not only help safeguard the integrity of
elections by discouraging election officials from improperly influencing or
stealing residents' votes, but also discourage politically-motivated third-party
attempts to disenfranchise LTC residents. Good procedures also help protect
against inept forms of assistance that might cause residents' ballots to be
excluded. "2

Traditionally, when election officials' assistance has been provided to LTC
residents, it has been provided in the context of absentee balloting. While having
all states provide LTC residents with election officials' assistance with absentee
balloting would be a significant improvement over the status quo, a superior
approach might be for election officials to conduct regular, on-site balloting.
Such an approach, sometimes called "mobile voting," would allow residents to
cast the equivalent of ballots voted at traditional polling places. In addition to
better facilitating voting by paper ballot, mobile voting could have the advantage
of allowing for the use of election technologies that could make it easier for LTC
residents to vote independently.'
B. Long-Term Care Facility Responsibilities
Having concluded that LTC institutions may not and should not prevent
residents from obtaining access to the ballot or to assistance with ballot
completion-even in situations in which facility staff reasonably believe
residents lack capacity to vote-the question is whether there is another role for
LTC facilities to play in the electoral process. The final section of this article
addresses this question. It concludes that LTC facilities should be considered to
be under an affirmative obligation to assist all residents in obtaining access to the
ballot. In making this argument, this article recognizes the significant barriers
that institutionalization places on access to the ballot.
1. Duty to ProvideAccess to the Ballot
If the right to vote is to be meaningful, LTC voters must be properly
registered to vote. Registration is often a challenge for residents of LTC
institutions who, by moving to a LTC facility, may have moved out of the district
where they are registered to vote. LTC facilities can easily help residents
overcome this simple but critically important hurdle to voting by providing
information about registration or change of address information to new residents

182. See, e.g., Womack v. Foster, 8 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Ark. 2000) (discussing how a campaign worker
for a candidate for County Municipal Judge solicited absentee ballots from nursing home residents but failed to
attach the medical affidavits to those ballots that were necessary for the underlying votes to be counted).
183. For a discussion of such technologies, see generally Ted Selker, The Technology of Access:
Allowing People of Age to Vote for Themselves, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1113 (2007).
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upon admission. "8 Specifically, facilities should provide information about and,
to the extent feasible, materials for registering to vote to all new residents upon
admission. Admission is an ideal time to provide registration information and
materials both because it facilitates timely registration and because residents are
likely to have relatives or friends assisting them with the admission process.
Therefore, they are likely to have someone available to assist them with
registration and potentially to discuss whether or not they should register.
For residents to have meaningful access to the ballot, however, it is not
enough for them to simply be registered to vote. Residents voting at regular
polling places need to know the location, date, and time for their polling place.
They may also require help arranging transportation or physical assistance in
order to safely vote at the polls. Residents voting by absentee ballot may also
need significant assistance in order to vote. For example, they may need
assistance in order to determine the timing of elections and procedures for
requesting a ballot, and to obtain access to a phone or to the mail in order to
request and return that ballot.
While these needs may seem minimal, they are not given the large barriers
that institutional living places on communication and information dissemination.
To counter this effect, facilities should provide timely and accessible information
about the timing and nature of upcoming elections to all residents. This would be
consistent with the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 and its implementing
regulations that explicitly recognize that nursing homes have affirmative duties to
help residents enjoy and exercise their civil rights.'
2.

Duty to Assist With Ballot Completion

As discussed previously, states should provide election officials to help LTC
residents with ballot completion. Where state officials are not readily available,
however, facility staff should be available to assist residents who specifically
request assistance with ballot completion. As long as a resident is able to request
assistance with ballot completion and clearly indicate his or her voting choices,
facility staff should not decline to provide the requested assistance. 86 To decline

184. Some facilities already provide such information upon admission. See Karlawish et al., Identifying
the Barriers, supra note 42, at 11 (in a survey of Philadelphia nursing homes and assisted living facilities,
finding that fifty-five percent of responding facilities had a written policy for voter registration, and that most of
these policies established a procedure for residents changing their address upon admission to the facility).
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(c)(1)(A) (2000) ("A nursing facility must protect and promote the rights of
each resident .. ); id. § 1395i-3(c)(1)(A) ("A skilled nursing facility must protect and promote the rights of
each resident .
); 42 C.F.R. § 483.10(a)(1)-(2) (2006) ("A facility must protect and promote the rights of
each resident, including.., the right to exercise his or her rights as a resident of the facility and as a citizen or
resident of the United States ...[and] the right to be free of interference, coercion, discrimination, and reprisal
from the facility in exercising his or her rights.").
186. In determining whether a resident has made a clear voting decision, staff members would face the
same issues as election officials and should follow similar procedures. See supra Part V.A.
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assistance in such situations would be to effectively condition residents' ability to
vote on their physical condition.
It is important that when staff members provide assistance they do so in a
transparent manner. Accordingly, to the extent possible, staff members providing
assistance should do so in two-person teams composed of staff members who do
not provide direct personal care to residents. Potentially appropriate staff
members would include the facility social worker or activities director. Such
practices help to safeguard the integrity of elections by, for example, helping
ensure that a witness is present should staff "assisting" residents try to vote for
them or unduly influence them. Accountability and transparency also help deter
and overcome third-party attempts to disenfranchise LTC residents. Moreover,
two-person teams increase the likelihood that assistance is properly rendered and
that no procedural mistakes are made that might disqualify residents' ballots.
Consistent with the aim of fostering transparent and accountable assistance
practices, unless a resident has explicitly requested assistance with ballot
completion from a third party, facilities should deny that third party the
opportunity to assist any resident with ballot completion unless: (1) the third
party is designated, under applicable laws, as the proper purveyor of such
assistance; or (2) the facility is confident that the third party is nonpartisan, and a
staff member joins the third party as the third party provides assistance, unless
the resident requests the staff member leave; or (3) the third party consists of
multiple parties representing all major opposing interests or candidates on the
ballot. Unless the third party is a close family member or close associate of the
resident, the facility should not consider the assistance of that party to have been
explicitly requested by the resident if that request is only made subsequent to an
offer by the third party to provide assistance. Finally, to further transparency and
accountability, facilities should promptly report suspicious offers of assistance to
election officials.
3. Duty of Nonpartisanship
Political candidates use a variety of techniques-ranging from visits, to
87
brochures, to videos delivered to a facility-to court the vote of LTC residents.'
Yet many facilities have no official policy governing how they respond to such
techniques. Indeed, a 1998 survey of a sample of nursing homes in Florida found
that most nursing 88homes did not even have official policies regarding political
candidates' visits.
A lack of official policies on political campaigning is problematic because it
may lead to LTC facilities giving more favorable treatment to some candidates
187.
candidates
note 34, at
188.

A survey of candidates for Florida state offices conducted in 1998 found that three percent of the
had used such videos and another seven percent had considered doing so. See MACMANUS, supra
69.
Id. at 39.
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than to others. Preferential treatment for certain candidates or parties, in turn, is
problematic because it can unduly influence the voting decisions of residents.
Especially in light of the closed nature of many LTC facilities, such preferential
treatment may have the effect of selectively exposing residents to only one-sided
campaign information or rhetoric. Moreover, preferential treatment may indicate
to residents that the facility or its staff favor a particular candidate, party, or
position and, especially considering the power imbalances between residents and
staff, residents may feel compelled or prodded to adhere to those preferences.
Adopting voluntary policies that promote nonpartisan practices, by contrast,
will help reduce the problem of actual or perceived preferential treatment.
Accordingly, LTC facilities should adopt policies promoting nonpartisan
practices.
Even more critical than the existence of policies is the content of such
policies. The previously mentioned 1998 survey of Florida nursing homes found
that among the minority of nursing homes that had official policies relating to
political campaigning, most barred political candidates from campaigning in the
facility.' 9 Such a prohibition severely limits residents' associational rights, their
ability to gain important electoral information, and their opportunity to influence
political figures. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the resident rights provisions of
the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 and its implementing regulations.'9"
Rather than barring candidate visits, facilities should permit-and potentially
even invite-candidates for elected office to meet with residents. Facilities
concerned about the disruptive effect of such visits or resident privacy could limit
the location of such visits to a facility-selected common area provided that
residents would be afforded private communications with candidates when
residents so requested. To ensure that preferential treatment for certain candidates is neither given nor assumed, when a candidate for elected office visits a
facility's residents, the facility should, to the extent feasible, contact opposing
candidates to inform them that they are also welcome to visit.
Such voluntary policies will help guide staff actions to promote residents'
access to candidates in a nonpartisan manner. In addition, such policies will
provide staff members with a principled way to explain their actions to politicians and other interested parties. For example, a politician who campaigned in
a facility with a policy such as that described above would know that if a staff
member subsequently invited opposing candidates to campaign in the facility,
that staff member was complying with facility policy and did not necessarily
favor the opposing candidate.

189.
190.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Voting as a resident of a LTC facility is not an easy task given residents'
physical and psychological conditions and the many barriers to voting that stem
directly from living in a LTC facility. Too often, whether LTC residents are able
to overcome these barriers and successfully exercise their constitutional right to
vote depends on the attitudes of facility staff toward resident voting.
LTC facilities may not and should not restrict or otherwise restrain residents'
access to the ballot. Rather, consistent with the aims and obligations of the
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, LTC facilities should be considered to be
under an affirmative obligation to assist all residents with obtaining access to
voting. While there are valid concerns that such facilitation may allow persons to
vote who lack capacity to do so, permitting or requiring facilities to screen
residents for voting capacity is not only legally untenable but creates more
problems than it solves. Similarly, LTC facilities should provide affirmative
assistance with ballot completion to residents who can request such assistance
and clearly indicate their voting decisions.
States too should take responsibility for ensuring that LTC residents with the
capacity to vote are able to do so by providing bipartisan election officials to
conduct absentee balloting in LTC facilities in which significant portions of
residents have physical disabilities that make voting at the polls unrealistic.
While states are entitled to disenfranchise persons lacking capacity to vote, and
LTC facilities undoubtedly concentrate such persons, states may not and should
not attempt to disenfranchise LTC residents by having election officials screen
residents for capacity to vote. If states believe that voting by persons without
capacity to vote is a significant problem, states should invest the resources
necessary to create specialized court procedures to address that problem. Such
procedures, if adopted, should include adequate notice and hearing rights and
should apply equally to all persons regardless of their residential status.
In considering how to address concerns about voting in LTC facilities,
policymakers should be careful not to conflate concerns about voting by persons
with dementia with concerns about voting fraud. The tension between access to
the ballot and the integrity of elections is a common one.' 9' However, in the
context of concerns about persons with dementia voting, certain measures
designed to reduce access would undermine election integrity, while certain
measures expanding access can be expected to increase integrity.
Finally, when designing laws and policies governing voting in LTC
institutions, it is critical to remember that how we as a nation treat the voting
rights of institutionalized persons matters. The right to vote is not only of
tremendous political value, but is also of tremendous symbolic and moral value.
Disenfranchising a class of citizens, or selectively creating barriers to the

191.

For example, this tension is currently being played out in the debate over voter identification laws.
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franchise that apply exclusively to a select class of citizens, sends a powerful
signal about the respect and significance such persons are to be accorded by their
fellow citizens.
VII. APPENDIX A: MODEL GUIDELINES FOR LONG-TERM CARE FACILITIES
These guidelines are designed to be voluntary in nature, although states
might have an interest in actively encouraging compliance with such guidelines
and potentially making aspects of them mandatory.
Model Guidelines for Lone-Term Care Facilities
Respecting Voting Rights
A. Facilities should recognize that residents' institutional status does not impact their
right to vote or to otherwise participate in the political process.
B. Facilities should presume that all residents have the capacity to vote unless they
have been adjudicated incompetent with regards to voting.
C. Nursing homes should recognize that facilitating access to voting is consistent with
their mandate under the Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987 and its implementing
regulations.
II.

Facilitating Access to Electoral Information
A. Facilities should provide information about, and (to the extent feasible) materials
for, registering to vote to all new residents upon admission.
B. Facilities should provide timely and accessible information about the timing and
nature of upcoming elections to all residents.
C. Facilities should allow all candidates for elected office to visit their facility.
Facilities may, where they deem appropriate, limit the location of such visits to a
facility-selected common area, provided that residents are afforded private
communications with candidates when residents so request.
D. Where a facility's residents have received a visit from a candidate for elected office,
facilities should, to the extent feasible, contact opposing candidates for the position
to inform them that they are also welcome to visit.

HI. Facilitating Access to Voting
A. Facility staff should ask all residents if they wish to vote and actively assist any
resident who wishes to vote with obtaining an absentee ballot, or utilizing mobile
voting where it is an option, unless the resident has been adjudicated incompetent
with respect to voting.
B. Unless other mechanisms for doing so are readily available, facilities should ensure
that all absentee ballots requested by residents are delivered to residents in a prompt
manner and, once completed, returned in a prompt manner.
IV. Providin2 Assistance with Ballot Completion
A. Where other assistance is not readily available, facility staff should be available to
assist residents who specifically request assistance with ballot completion and
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B.

C.

V.

should provide such assistance so long as the resident is able to clearly communicate
his or her voting choice or choices.
If facility staff assisting with ballot completion reasonably conclude that a resident
requesting assistance is unable to make a determination as to how to vote without
the assistance of a staff member, facility staff should decline to provide the
requested assistance.
To the extent feasible, when facility staff provide assistance with ballot completion,
they should do so in two-person teams composed of staff members who do not
provide direct personal care.

Guarding Against Suspect Forms of Assistance
A. Unless a resident has explicitly requested assistance with ballot completion from a
third party, facilities may and should deny that third party the opportunity to assist
any resident with ballot completion unless: (1) the third party is designated, under
applicable laws, as the proper purveyor of such assistance; (2) the facility is
confident that the third party is nonpartisan, and a staff member joins the third party
as the third party provides assistance, unless the resident requests that the staff
member leave; or (3) the third party consists of multiple parties representing all
major opposing interests or candidates on the ballot.
B. Unless the third party providing assistance with voting to a resident is a close family
member or close associate of the resident, the facility should not consider the

C.

assistance of that party to have been explicitly requested by the resident if that
request is only made subsequent to an offer by the third party to provide assistance.
Facilities should promptly report all suspicious offers of assistance to election
officials.
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VIII. APPENDIX B: FRAMEWORK

FOR MODEL STATE LEGISLATION

This framework is designed as a template for model state legislation in states
that intend to rely on absentee balloting to reach voters who are unable to vote at
regular polling places. Since the administration of elections is a state-specific
task and election procedures and needs vary significantly from state to state, the
framework would have to be adjusted for each state to reflect differences in state
procedures and traditions.
Notably, the basic approach embodied by this framework is also applicable
to states that decide to use mobile voting to reach such LTC residents. Additional
modifications, however, would be required.
Framework for Model State Legislation
Definitions
A. The Electoral Unit is the governmental entity with direct responsibility for
administering absentee ballots in a given jurisdiction.
B. A Long-Term Care Facility is any institution licensed to provide room and board, as
well as personal care and/or medical supervision to persons in need of assistance
with activities of daily living (ADLs) or multiple instrumental activities of daily
living (IADLs).
C. A Qualified Long-Term Care Facility is a Long-Term Care Facility in which five or
more Registered Voters reside.
D. An Election Agent is an individual appointed by the Electoral Unit to administer
absentee balloting in a Qualified Long-Term Care Facility.
E. A Resident is a person whose permanent or current residence is a Long-Term Care
Facility.
F. A Registered Voter is a person lawfully registered to vote in the jurisdiction in
which he or she resides.
II.

Provision of Absentee Ballots to Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities
A. If the Electoral Unit determines that five or more Registered Voters reside in a
Long-Term Care Facility, the Long-Term Care Facility shall be deemed a Qualified
Long-Term Care Facility.
B. The Electoral Unit may, in its discretion, consider all Long-Term Care Facilities
within its jurisdiction to be Qualified Long-Term Care Facilities regardless of the
number of registered voters residing in those facilities.
C. The Electoral Unit shall appoint two or more Election Agents to conduct absentee
balloting in each Qualified Long-Term Care Facility in its jurisdiction.
D. Each Election Agent shall work as part of a team composed of two or more Election
Agents, each of whom is a bona fide member of a different political party. Each
team of Election Agents shall include at least two members of major political
parties.
E. A team of Election Agents shall personally and jointly visit each Qualified LongTerm Care Facility for the purpose of conducting absentee balloting no more than
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F.

seven days before or after the date of an election. During these visits, the team of
Election Agents shall deliver an absentee ballot directly and personally to each
Registered Voter who is a Resident of the facility and who has requested an absentee
ballot. Unless the Resident requests otherwise, the team of Election Agents shall
remain present while the Resident completes the ballot. Unless the Resident requests
otherwise, the team of Election Agents shall also have full and sole responsibility for
returning the Resident's ballot once completed, or, if the Resident declines to vote,
once the ballot has been rejected.
The team of Election Agents shall effect such safeguards as may be practicable and
necessary to provide secrecy for the votes cast by Residents.

III. Provision of Assistance with Ballot Completion to Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities
A. A Resident shall be entitled to assistance with ballot completion if he or she is
unable to mark his or her ballot but is able to communicate how he or she wishes the
B.

ballot to be marked and requests assistance with marking the ballot.
One or more Election Agents shall provide assistance with marking a ballot if
requested to do so by a Resident who meets the requirements of Section III.A.

IV. Registration of Voters Residing in Lone-Term Care Facilities
A. All Long-Term Care Facilities shall provide a Resident with information about how
to register to vote and how to obtain an absentee ballot within fourteen (14) days of
the Resident's admission to the Long-Term Care Facility.
B. When a team of Election Agents is at a Long-Term Care Facility for the purpose of
conducting absentee balloting, they shall personally visit each Registered Voter who
is a Resident but who has not requested an absentee ballot. The team of Election
Agents shall inform such Residents that they are entitled to vote by absentee ballot
and provide information in plain language to such Residents indicating how they can
request an absentee ballot.
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